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Introduction 
Among attorneys, judges, and legal academics, there is virtual consensus 
that the widespread use by business firms of standard-form contracts in their 
dealings with consumers has completely eliminated bargaining in consumer 
contracts. I believe that this perception is false, that rather than precluding 
bargaining and negotiation, standard-form contracts in fact facilitate bar-
gaining and are a crucial instrument in the establishment and maintenance 
of cooperative relationships between firms and their customers. On this 
view, which I elaborate below, firms use clear and unconditional standard-
form contract terms not because they will insist upon those terms, but be-
cause they have given their managerial employees the discretion to grant 
exceptions from the standard-form terms on a case-by-case basis. In prac-
tice, acting through its agents, a firm will often provide benefits to 
consumers who complain beyond those that its standard form obligates it to 
provide, and it will forgive consumer breach of standard-form terms. Firms 
do this because they have an interest in building and maintaining coopera-
tive, value-enhancing relationships with their customers. Were firms legally 
required to extend such benefits or forgiveness—as would result either from 
judicial invalidation of the tough standard-form performance terms or legis-
latively mandated generous standard-form performance terms—then both 
firms and their customers would be worse off.  
Most of my analysis here is concerned with standard-form terms of per-
formance: contract terms that set out, for example, the amounts and 
repayment dates on a consumer loan, or an airline passenger’s rights to be 
upgraded to a first-class seat. While my main concern is with such standard-
form performance terms, I also discuss what may be called standard-form 
breakdown terms—terms that determine where and how an “endgame” dis-
pute over breach of the performance terms will be resolved.1 Unlike 
performance terms, which firms intend to forgive or expand upon when so 
doing is consistent with building and maintaining valuable customer rela-
tionships, breakdown terms are not meant to be varied, since breakdown 
                                                                                                                      
 1. My discussion of these “endgame” standard-form terms relies, for its inspiration and 
terminology, on Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Coopera-
tion Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724 (2001). 
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signals that no mutually beneficial customer relationship exists. Moreover, 
the optimal breakdown terms are those that maximize the firm’s incentives 
to pursue discretionary, cooperative tailoring of its customer relationships. 
By systematically overcompensating consumers with large claims against 
business firms, and undercompensating those who have relatively small 
claims against such firms, the civil justice system blunts or eliminates such 
incentives. By offering a more predictable and more uniform schedule of 
damages, private arbitration can offer a form of endgame dispute resolution 
that allows firms to focus more on business value and less on litigation risk 
in negotiating the terms of their ongoing consumer relationships. 
My analysis of both standard-form performance and standard-form 
breakdown terms generates some advice for courts employing common law 
contract doctrines. Courts should presume that standard-form contract terms 
are a valid and enforceable part of the bargain between business firms, their 
customers, and their employees. At the same time, however, courts must 
recognize that opportunistic firms will use standard forms to renege on 
promises to offer the tailored and flexible forgiveness and accommodation 
offered by good firms. To prevent such behavior, courts should enforce addi-
tional promises or concessions made by agents of the firm that go beyond 
standard-form obligations, provided that there is clear evidence that such 
promises were actually made. Courts should also ensure that standard-form 
arbitration clauses do indeed offer uniform and predictable remedies, rather 
than no remedies at all. 
Part II of this Article presents empirical evidence demonstrating that 
firms routinely grant their agents the authority to exercise their discretion to 
forgive the breach of and extend benefits beyond standard-form consumer-
contract terms. Such a strategy of using ex-ante clear and unconditional 
standard-form contract obligations together with discretionary ex-post for-
giveness or ex-post benefit conferral comprises what I call a “two-part 
standard-form contract.” Part III develops an economic, game-theoretic ex-
planation for such two–part standard-form contracts, how firms determine 
the optimal combination of standard-form terms and ex-post discretion, and 
why they could not accomplish the same socially desirable strategic goal if 
they were not permitted to exercise the discretion to vary standard-form 
terms. Part IV discusses the model’s implications for traditional legal con-
cerns about the distributive impact of standard-form consumer contracts. 
Part V explains implications for doctrines that determine the enforceability 
of promises that vary or add to the terms of standard-form contracts. Part VI 
analyzes how standard-form breakdown terms determine the viability of the 
optimal two-part standard-form contract. I begin in Part I with a brief intel-
lectual history of academic and judicial thinking about standard-form 
contracts. 
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I. From Contracts of Adhesion to Market Assent 
As Friedrich Kessler famously observed over sixty years ago,2 the late-
nineteenth-century development of mass production and mass distribution of 
consumer goods brought with it the standardized mass-consumer contract.3 
Just like consumer goods, standardized contracts are mass marketed. On the 
traditional story told by legal scholars,4 a firm’s attorneys write the terms of 
these contracts, which then accompany the sale of all the firm’s products (or, 
increasingly, services). Between the consumer and the sales agent (or re-
tailer), there is no bargaining over the terms of such contracts. They are 
automatically bundled together with the sale of the good or service.  
In its core doctrines, the common law of contracts was already well de-
veloped when standardized consumer contracts appeared on the scene. One 
of those core doctrines is that a legally enforceable contract requires “a 
manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange,”5 or, in somewhat more col-
loquial terms, an agreement. Induced from a body of case law dealing 
largely with non-standard, negotiated transactions, the common law’s para-
digm for the “manifestation of mutual assent” is that of a bargaining process 
which culminates when one party makes an offer that the other finally ac-
cepts.6 
The paradigmatic standardized consumer transaction does not, however, 
involve an individualized negotiation over price and other terms, but rather 
the posting of set prices for goods and services with standardized (albeit 
typically varying) characteristics. In the modern economy, consumer sales 
occur not through the haggling and dickering of the market bazaar, but 
rather through the cool, calm efficiency of mass retailing. While it is possi-
ble to uncover (create?) an “offer” and “acceptance” pattern even in 
common, standardized consumer transactions, it must be conceded that 
those sales do not emerge from the kind of individualized bargaining proc-
ess that gave rise to the offer and acceptance paradigm. While common-law 
judges understood that mass production and marketing brought consumers a 
once unimaginable diversity of products and services delivered by producers 
who were pressured by constant competition to keep prices and costs down, 
they found it hard to see how consumers were legally assenting to the stan-
dard-form contract used in such a world. Indeed, judges and legal scholars 
viewed market-driven uniformity in standard-form contract terms with 
alarm, perceiving that even in reasonably competitive markets, consumers 
                                                                                                                      
 2. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 
43 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 631 (1943). 
 3. Standardized product warranties, for example, were apparently found as early as the late-
nineteenth century. See George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 Yale L.J. 
1297, 1299 (1981). 
 4. For one statement of this story, see Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in 
Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1174, 1225 (1983). 
 5. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 17 (1981). 
 6. The various rules on offer and acceptance are found at Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts §§ 24–70 (1981). 
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often had no choice of contract terms, so that a consumer’s apparent con-
tractual assent to such terms was really “but a subjection more or less 
voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger party, terms whose consequences 
are often understood only in a vague way, if at all.”7 Uniform standardized 
contracts became subject to the epithet “contracts of adhesion.”8 
By the 1970s, both courts and commentators had reached a virtual con-
sensus regarding the evil of form contracts. As recounted by George Priest,9 
academic commentators viewed standard-form consumer-product warranties 
variously as a form of fraud10 or as evidence that consumer product manu-
facturers had unbridled discretion to draft standard-form terms such as 
warranties simply to minimize their costs.11 Courts across the country fol-
lowed the New Jersey Supreme Court’s famous decision in Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc.12 refusing to enforce the terms of a standard-form 
warranty disclaiming the implied warranty of merchantability and excluding 
liability for consequential damages in a case involving serious bodily injury. 
That court’s reasoning is worth quoting in detail, for its tone perfectly cap-
tures the view of standard-form contracts that prevailed during this period:  
 The warranty before us is a standardized form designed for mass use. 
It is imposed upon the automobile consumer. He takes it or leaves it, and 
he must take it to buy an automobile. No bargaining is engaged in with re-
spect to it. In fact, the dealer through whom it comes to the buyer is 
without authority to alter it . . . . The form warranty is not only standard 
with Chrysler but . . . it is the uniform warranty of the Automobile Manu-
facturers Association. . . .  
 The gross inequality of bargaining position occupied by the consumer 
in the automobile industry is thus apparent. There is no competition among 
the car makers in the area of the express warranty. Where can the buyer go 
to negotiate for better protection? . . . Because there is no competition 
among the motor vehicle manufacturers with respect to the scope of pro-
tection guaranteed to the buyer, there is no incentive on their part to 
stimulate good will in that field of public relations. . . .13 
                                                                                                                      
 7. Kessler, supra note 2, at 632. Such a perception was widespread across the ideological 
spectrum, with Lord Devlin, hardly someone whom one would consider a great progressive, arguing 
stridently that “[i]f the modern lawyer had to single out the contract which now bears most marks of 
oppressive and unfair dealing, I think he would probably select one in the mass of small print which 
the large concern thrusts upon the small man in a ‘take it or leave it way.’ ” Patrick Devlin, The 
Enforcement of Morals 49 (1968, 1972 reprint). 
 8. This term, as Kessler recounts, originated quite early in the twentieth century, with 
Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 198, 222 (1919). 
Kessler, supra note 2, at 632 n.11 
 9. Priest, supra note 3, at 1300–02. 
 10. W. David Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 
12 (1974). 
 11. William C. Whitford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of the Automo-
bile Warranty, 1968 Wis. L. Rev. 1006. 
 12. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
 13. Id. at 87. 
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This basic reasoning—stressing the uniformity within an industry as 
showing lack of consumer choice—was applied by courts in refusing to en-
force standard-form terms similarly limiting the liability of mass-product 
and service providers in other fields, such as landlords.14 
Such reasoning suffered from two very basic weaknesses. On the one 
hand, the theory underlying it—what Priest aptly labeled the exploitation 
theory of the consumer standard-form contract15—did not have any explana-
tion for uniform standard-form contract terms other than that they reflected 
the untrammeled power of firms to maximize profits at consumers’ expense. 
And with such a weak explanation for the supposedly problematic observed 
empirical regularity, it was perhaps not surprising that courts never really 
fashioned a coherent doctrinal test for when they would enforce standard-
form terms and when they would not. On the one hand, it seemed as if 
courts were only really concerned with standard-form adhesion terms if they 
appeared in contracts for goods or services—such as autos or housing—that 
judges thought were really important or necessary.16 On the other hand, what 
courts really seemed to worry about when determining whether the stan-
dard-form terms would be enforced or instead struck down as 
unconscionable was not the importance of the good or service, but the rela-
tive sophistication of a particular consumer, her education and income level, 
and the circumstances under which the standard-form terms were presented 
for her perusal.17 The suggested solutions of some academics, such as Todd 
Rakoff’s proposal that (under circumstances identified by a seven-factor 
test) courts impose a fiduciary obligation on sellers of consumer goods and 
services to act only in the consumer’s interest, rather than in the interest of 
their own firm’s profit and sales goals, apparently represented too great a 
departure from the background principles of free markets for the courts to 
adopt.18 
Into this explanatory and doctrinal gap strode the law-and-economics 
scholars of the 1980s. Early in that decade, Schwartz and Wilde demon-
strated in a general theoretical setting how even a quite small proportion of 
smart consumers who actually read and shopped for good standard-form 
contract clauses could put enough competitive pressure on firms so that they 
would adopt efficient standard-form terms (terms whose cost to the firm was 
                                                                                                                      
 14. See, e.g., Galligan v. Arovitch, 219 A.2d 463 (Pa. 1966). 
 15. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 3, at 1309. 
 16. For instance, in Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 177 N.E.2d 925, 927 (N.Y. 1961), the 
court enforced a liability disclaimer in a gym membership agreement, stating that “[h]ere there is no 
special legal relationship and no overriding public interest which demand that this contract provi-
sion, voluntarily entered into by competent parties, should be rendered ineffectual.”  
 17. With the classic statement of this attitude, leading to invalidation of a standard-form 
consumer-installment sales contract’s cross-collateralization clause, being Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.D.C. 1965). 
 18. See Rakoff, supra note 4, at 1248–83. 
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less than the value that consumers placed upon them).19 In a quite different, 
but equally persuasive, methodological spirit, Priest20 showed that the ob-
served variation across product types in the scope and length of consumer 
warranties could be explained as optimally allocating responsibility for 
product malfunction between the producer and the consumer. By the end of 
the decade, it seemed that both uniformity and variation in standard-form 
mass-transaction contracts could be explained as the product not of con-
sumer ignorance and firm power, but of (sufficiently) informationally 
efficient markets. Regardless of whether any particular consumer had ever 
read, understood, or bargained over the terms of the standard form, informed 
consumers generated a form of hypothetical market assent, which would 
bind all consumers. 
The theory of market assent has always had its academic skeptics,21 but 
by the 1990s (in large part through the influence of opinions written by law-
and-economics scholars turned federal judges), this theory of market assent 
had even been accepted by the Supreme Court. In upholding the enforceabil-
ity of a standard-form forum-selection clause in a consumer cruise-line 
ticket (under a “fundamental fairness” test it had set up under its admiralty 
jurisdiction), the Court was untroubled by the uniformity of the clause 
within the industry, and remarkably confident in the reality of market assent: 
[R]espondents’ passage contract was purely routine and doubtless nearly 
identical to every commercial passage contract issued by petitioner and 
most other cruise lines. In this context, it would be entirely unreasonable 
for us to assume that respondents—or any other cruise passenger—would 
negotiate with petitioner the terms of a forum-selection clause in an ordi-
nary commercial cruise ticket. Common sense dictates that a ticket of this 
kind will be a form contract the terms of which are not subject to negotia-
tion, and that an individual purchasing the ticket will not have bargaining 
parity with the cruise line. . . .  
  . . . . [Still, i]ncluding a reasonable forum clause in a form contract of 
this kind well may be permissible for several reasons: First, a cruise line 
has a special interest in limiting the fora in which it potentially could be 
subject to suit. Because a cruise ship typically carries passengers from 
many locales, it is not unlikely that a mishap on a cruise could subject the 
cruise line to litigation in several different fora. Additionally, a clause es-
tablishing ex ante the forum for dispute resolution has the salutary effect of 
dispelling any confusion about where suits arising from the contract must 
be brought and defended, sparing litigants the time and expense of pretrial 
motions to determine the correct forum and conserving judicial resources 
                                                                                                                      
 19. The seminal presentation of this claim to the legal academy is Alan Schwartz & Louis L. 
Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Se-
curity Interests, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1387 (1983). 
 20. Priest, supra note 3, at 1298. 
 21. See, e.g., Jeffrey Davis, Revamping Consumer-Credit Contract Law, 68 Va. L. Rev. 
1333, 1345 (1982) (arguing that some credit suppliers are immune to market pressures, which are in 
any event significantly attenuated because too small a proportion of consumers shop for desirable 
credit terms).  
JOHNSTON FINAL TYPE2.DOC 2/16/2006 8:38 AM 
864 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:857 
 
that otherwise would be devoted to deciding those motions. Finally, it 
stands to reason that passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum 
clause like that at issue in this case benefit in the form of reduced fares re-
flecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which 
it may be sued.22 
As the twentieth century ended, the confidence of the Court and aca-
demic commentators was tested by both new theories and new practices. In 
practice, during the 1990s, a new kind of standard-form contract clause, the 
mandatory arbitration provision, swept the world of standard-form con-
sumer and employment contracts. While the Court reacted sympathetically 
to the advent of standard-form mandatory arbitration clauses—as represent-
ing not only a market-driven efficiency, but one that Congress had endorsed 
in enacting the Federal Arbitration Act23—lower state and federal courts 
struggled with whether or not such clauses were unenforceable as uncon-
scionable. In legal academia, a new and rising body of scholarship applying 
findings from experimental psychology of widespread and serious human 
cognitive limitations gave new life to the old exploitation theory of stan-
dard-form terms.24  
Like existing economic models and judicial doctrine, recent scholarship 
applying experimental psychology takes it for granted that standard-form 
contracts are not designed to encourage bargaining, but to preclude it. Below 
I construct a model that grants (indeed is built upon) the fact that most if not 
all individual consumers and employees will never read, let alone under-
stand, all the terms in a firm’s standard-form contract. What my model 
reveals, however, is that while this fact may mean that firms and individual 
consumers and employees do not bargain over standard-form terms, they 
actively bargain in the shadow of those terms.  
II. Bargaining around Standard-Form Terms: Some Evidence 
My understanding of the economic function of standard-form contracts 
begins not with breakdown terms, but with the terms of performance. Virtu-
ally every firm that sells goods or services or extends some form of credit to 
consumers has certain standard-form contractual terms governing such 
things as when and how payment is due, when and if a good can be re-
turned, whether charges are made for services beyond those originally 
contracted for, and other related matters. While set out in contractual forms 
that are standard in all the firm’s dealings, the evidence shows that the actual 
                                                                                                                      
 22. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–94 (1991) (citations omitted) 
(relying on and citing the reasoning in Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 
1990)). For an argument that the market assent reasoning in Shute and similar cases is consistent 
with classical contract notions of assent, see Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (2002).  
 23. Codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14, 201–08. 
 24. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the 
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429 (2002); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard-
form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203 (2003). 
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implementation of these various policies must be done on a case-by-case 
basis, whether by firm employees who work at particular stores, or by 
staffers in centralized call centers. The common practice among firms is to 
give their employees the discretion to depart from these standard-form terms 
and to deliver more than the firm has actually promised if deemed in the 
firm’s best interest to do so. Typically, the firm’s standard-form terms set out 
clear and unconditional consumer obligations but allow firm discretion that 
is exercised by a supervisory (and sometimes lower level) employee who is 
given the authority and discretion to forgive. In this part of the Article, I set 
out some selected evidence on the pervasiveness of this pattern of contract-
ing, which I call a two-part, or discretionary, standard-form contract.25 
A. Hospital Bills 
A major problem for hospitals and ambulatory-care facilities is nonpay-
ment of medical bills by outpatients. A USA Today article noted that 
“[h]ospitals can raise charges to any amount the market will bear, but it’s an 
odd market because most hospital customers negotiate discounts off 
charges.”26 This statement is borne out by exchanges on The Dollar 
Stretcher, a mediated online-discussion board,27 where a patient who in-
quired about negotiating over hospital bills received a variety of responses. 
One woman noted that after she and her husband got a hefty hospital 
bill, she called the accounting department immediately to negotiate. “The 
thing to do is immediately upon receiving the bill is [sic] call the accounting 
office at the hospital and doctors [sic] offices ([if] they send their own bills) 
[and] explain that you do not have the funds to pay in full but would like to 
make monthly payments.”28 
Following the recommendations of industry consultants,29 many, proba-
bly most, hospitals have dedicated “assistance officers” or “financial 
counselors,” whose jobs are to work out payment plans with patients. A hos-
pital employee noted that hospital financial counselors “often will negotiate 
                                                                                                                      
 25. I stress that this is merely a selection. A closer look at many other industries would, I 
believe, reveal the same pattern. There is, for instance, evidence that people negotiate with their cell 
phone carriers, post-contract. CBS online encourages people to “[n]egotiate with your carrier. If you 
see a cheaper deal somewhere else, call your carrier and see if it will offer you something similar. 
Carriers are anxious to keep you as a customer, so it never hurts to ask for a better deal.” Become a 
Happier Cell Phone Owner, CBS News, Mar. 10, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 
2005/03/10/earlyshow/living/money/main679246.shtml. 
 26. Julie Appleby, Hospital Bills Spin Out of Control, USA Today, Apr. 13, 2004, at A1. 
 27. Reducing Hospital Bills, Dollar Stretcher, http://www.stretcher.com/stories/980923c.cfm 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2005).  
 28. Id. 
 29. See, e.g., Roger J. Hull, Screen Outpatients for Better Collections, Hosp. Fin. Mgmt., 
Nov. 1978, at 32, 32. The author recommends having the computer select out nonpayers from the 
patient population and then interviewing such patients individually before treatment to try to iden-
tify their ability to pay and to work out individualized monthly payment plans as a precondition for 
receiving treatment (excepting, of course, the “obviously ill”). He estimates that one account repre-
sentative can conduct about forty ten-minute interviews per day and that such interviews 
conservatively will bring in 10% of past-due accounts that would otherwise not come in. Id. at 33.  
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the charges . . . . [P]hysicians will do the same thing, especially if they know 
you don’t have insurance.”30 Another hospital employee stated, “My job re-
quires me to negotiate with medical providers. I can assure you that 
hospitals can, and will, negotiate charges. They would rather get paid by you 
than turn the bill over to a collection agency, or worse, write the charges 
off.” The employee went on, “I would explain your financial situation, and 
offer a lowball sum, mayby [sic] 25%. I would not expect to pay less than 
50%. They will often discount to 2/3. if [sic] they want you to pay more 
than 75% ask for the person’s supervisor.”31 The website for the American 
Academy of Family Physicians goes so far as to recommend negotiating 
payment plans with hospitals and doctors. In a section of their web page 
entitled “Financial Management During Crisis,” the AAFP recommends,  
As soon as possible, call doctors’ offices, billing departments, hospital 
business offices, creditors, and lending institutions to explain the change in 
your family’s situation. Most people are willing to work with you, but they 
won’t know that you need help unless you tell them.  
 . . . .  
 Creditors can be lenient—arranging payment schedules, accepting 
partial payments, and so on—but they need to hear from you. Even if you 
can only make a portion of a payment, it will show an attempt to keep up 
your side of the obligation.32 
In the case of hospital bills, there is systematic survey evidence that con-
firms the anecdotal evidence of widespread negotiation around standard-
form payment terms. A Harris Interactive survey shows that while negotiat-
ing over hospital bills is not quite ubiquitous, it is common:33 
 
[Question:] “In the last 12 months, have you ever talked to any of the fol-
lowing to see if you could pay a lower price than they had billed you, or 
wanted to bill you? [sic] 
Base: All adults 
                                                                                                                      
 30. The Dollar Stretcher, supra note 27. 
 31. Id. Another former employee noted, “[Hospitals] don’t want to have to send you to col-
lection—it’s much better for them to get the full amount, even if it takes longer (collection agencies 
take a percentage). I’ve seen payment plans as little as $25 a month.” Id. 
 32. Familydoctor.org, Am. Acad of Family Physicians, Financial Management During Crisis, 
http://www.kidshealth.org/PageManager.jsp?dn=familydoctor&lic=44&article_set=21736 (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2005).  
 33. Harris Interactive, “Haggling” with Health Care Providers About Their Prices Likely to 
Increase Sharply as Out-of-Pocket Costs Rise (Mar. 6, 2002), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/ 
news/allnewsbydate.asp?NewsID=443. The questions and charts in the body of this Article are 
excerpted directly from the website. 
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 % % % % 
Pharmacist 17 10 18 27 
Doctor 13 10 12 20 
Dentist 12 12 12 13 
Hospital 10 7 9 20 
 . . . .  
[Question:] “Were you successful in getting to pay a lower price?” 
Base: Talked to (provider) about Medical Bills 
  Was Successful (As A Percentage of All 
Adults) 
  % % 
Pharmacist 48 (8) 
Doctor 54 (7) 
Dentist 47 (6) 
Hospital 45 (5) 
 
The polls also showed that if hospital costs continue to rise, many more 
people would contemplate negotiating over their medical bills:34 
[Question:] “In the last two years, if the out-of-pocket cost to you of your 
medical bills, that is, after whatever your insurance pays for, increases sub-
stantially, how likely would you be to negotiate a better price for a medical 
bill?” 
Base: All adults 
   Health Status 




  % % % % 
Very likely 32 33 32 33 
Likely 21 21 21 23 
Somewhat likely 22 24 23 16 
Not at all likely 12 16 10 15 
Not sure 12 6 15 14 
 
                                                                                                                      
 34. Id. 
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B. Consumer Credit Cards 
The consumer credit-card industry is a foundation of the American 
economy, with outstanding revolving credit-card debt standing at over $800 
billion35 and over 44% of American families relying on credit-card borrow-
ing to finance purchases.36 Credit-card contracts are full of terms that 
epitomize the pairing of bright-line borrower obligations with discretionary 
lender forgiveness. A typical credit-card contract37 grants a grace period dur-
ing which time balances may be repaid without the borrower incurring the 
stated finance charge, and grace periods are typically stated as, for example, 
“not less than 20 days,” thus giving the issuer the option to extend the grace 
period beyond twenty days. Similarly, the default rate “equals the U.S. 
Prime Rate plus up to 23.99%,” with “[f]actors considered in determining” 
the default rate including “how long your account has been open, the timing 
or seriousness of a default, or other indications of account performance.” 
Although there is no preset spending limit, “[e]ach charge that causes your 
balance to exceed your revolving credit line will be evaluated based on ac-
count usage and performance, other account relationships with us and your 
experience with other creditors.” Finally, the contract allows the issuer to 
“change the rates, fees, and terms of your account at any time for any rea-
son,” where, controversially, such a reason may include “information in 
your credit report, such as your failure to make payments to another creditor 
when due, amounts owed to other creditors, the number of credit accounts 
outstanding, or the number of credit inquiries.”38 Clearly, in a number of key 
terms, the consumer credit-card contract is written with minimal bright-line 
borrower guarantees but lots of room for what I have called “tailored for-
giveness” by the issuer. 
While I have not yet found any systematic empirical data on how often 
credit-card issuers renegotiate debt, the existing informal and anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that this practice is common. A raft of best-seller books on 
consumer finances recommend negotiating around credit-card contract 
terms including the interest rate, annual fee, late payment fee, payment 
                                                                                                                      
 35. This figure reflects total outstanding revolving debt as of January 2005. Fed. Reserve, 
Consumer Credit: January 2005, Fed. Res. Stat. Release, Mar. 7, 2005, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/20050307/g19.pdf. 
 36. As reported in the most recently available Survey of Consumer Finances. See Anna M. 
Aizcorbe et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey 
of Consumer Finances, 89 Fed. Res. Bull. 1, 24 (2003). 
 37. The examples used here are the terms, available online, of the Citi Gold/AAdvantage 
World Mastercard. See Citi Cards Products, Terms and Conditions, http://www.citibank.com/ 
us/cards/cardserv/worldcard/gold.jsp (follow “Terms & Conditions” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 20, 
2005).  
 38. Id. The so-called “universal default” provision has recently come under intense criticism 
from consumer groups and some members of Congress, and the Comptroller of the Currency has 
issued an advisory letter calling for more transparent disclosure of the universal default term. See 
Andrew Blackman, Personal Business: Universal Default Can Snare Cardholders, Wall St. J., 
Feb. 20, 2005, at 4; Linda Punch, Getting Tough?, Credit Card Mgmt., Feb. 2005, at 42. 
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moratoria, and repayment schedules.39 The frequency with which repayment 
obligations are renegotiated is perhaps most strongly evidenced by the fact 
that repayment negotiation—consumer credit-card “workouts”—has been 
prominent among several credit-card industry practices that have recently 
been under very high-level regulatory scrutiny. In July of 2002, the four fed-
eral regulatory agencies with jurisdiction over credit-card issuers put out a 
draft “Account Management and Loss Allowance Guidance” (“Draft Guid-
ance”).40 This document criticized credit-card companies for a variety of 
practices that extended credit to borrowers beyond the borrowers’ ability to 
pay, increasing creditor risk exposure to very high levels. The Draft Guid-
ance criticized credit-card issuers for issuing borrowers too many cards and 
too liberally allowing borrowers to exceed their credit-line limits. It also 
criticized the way that issuers were handling their “workout” programs, pro-
grams set up to allow borrowers to pay off the outstanding balances on 
formerly open-ended (and now closed) credit cards. As noted in the Draft 
Guidance, workouts are used “when a customer is either unwilling or unable 
to repay the open-end credit card account in accordance with its original 
terms, but shows the willingness and ability to repay the loan in accordance 
with its modified terms and conditions.”41 The Draft Guidance criticized 
credit-card issuers’ workout programs for not reducing interest rates, fees, 
and finance charges sufficiently to allow borrowers to extinguish their debts 
within “reasonable time frames.”42 The Draft Guidance urged that since con-
sumer credit counseling services typically try to get borrowers to repay 
credit-card debt within forty-eight months, credit-card lenders should reduce 
or eliminate interest rates and fees so that repayment terms for workout pro-
grams were also “generally” forty-eight months, “with exceptions clearly 
documented and supported by compelling evidence that less conservative 
terms and conditions are warranted.”43  
                                                                                                                      
 39. See, e.g., Beth Kobliner, Get a Financial Life: Personal Finance in Your Twen-
ties and Thirties 62 (2000) (encouraging negotiation with credit-card issuers for lower rates); 
Suze Orman, The Money Book for the Young, Fabulous & Broke 88–89 (2005) (encourages 
using the threat of transfer to get a lower credit-card rate); Steven Strauss & Azriela Jaffe, The 
Complete Idiot’s Guide to Beating Debt 81–90 (2000) (an entire chapter on negotiating with 
creditors); Eric Tyson, Personal Finance for Dummies 76 (4th ed. 2003) (encouraging negotia-
tion with creditors).  
 40. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., Credit Card Lending (2002) (draft guid-
ance) [hereinafter Draft Guidance], available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/4/48908.pdf. The 
final version is now available. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., Credit 
Card Lending (2003), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/2003-1a.pdf. 
 41. Draft Guidance, supra note 40, at 3 n.1. 
 42. Id. at 3. 
 43. More precisely, the Draft Guidance stated:  
 Workout programs should be designed to maximize principal reduction. Debt man-
agement plans developed by consumer credit counseling services generally strive to have 
borrowers repay credit card debt within 48 months. Repayment terms for workout pro-
grams should be generally consistent with these time frames, with exceptions clearly 
documented and supported by compelling evidence that less conservative terms and con-
ditions are warranted. To meet these time frames, institutions may need to substantially 
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Credit-card issuers responded almost immediately to the Draft Guid-
ance. They correctly noted that it was essentially calling for a dramatic 
change in credit-issuer operations, from one focused on “portfolio review 
and management of the millions of consumer loans . . . to an increasing su-
pervisory review of individual loans.”44  
Issuers complained that, even as they seemed to require such costly in-
dividualized management of millions of consumer loans, financial 
institution examiners would interpret the Draft Guidance’s recommenda-
tions as bright-line rules barring over-limit authorizations under any 
circumstances and requiring repayment of borrower workouts within forty-
eight days.45 Their existing policy of offering over-limit authorizations in 
certain circumstances was, the issuers claimed, an important customer-
relations tool in getting and keeping the business of good, low-credit-risk 
customers who occasionally had emergency credit needs that caused them to 
exceed their limits. Without such discretionary over-limit authorizations, 
issuers would need to grant higher initial credit lines or else risk losing their 
best, lowest risk customers.46 Similarly, the issuers argued against a bright-
line forty-eight month repayment period in workouts, and in favor of a “rea-
sonable and prudent timeframe[]” that would retain issuer discretion to 
“address each consumer’s individual needs and circumstances.”47 The major-
ity of consumers in debt-workout programs could not repay their 
outstanding balances within a forty-eight month period, the issuers argued, 
so if forty-eight months was made into a mandatory cap on repayment 
terms, issuers would have to respond by increasing interest rates and relax-
ing participation standards.48  
C. Home-Mortgage and Home-Equity Lending 
A similar pattern is revealed in home-equity and mortgage lending 
workouts. Home-loan workouts typically involve either a repayment plan in 
which a borrower in default is allowed to pay back the past-due amount over 
time, provided that she resume making contractually required periodic pay-
ments, or an actual modification of the loan in which the past-due amount is 
                                                                                                                      
reduce or eliminate interest rates and fees so that more of the payment is applied to re-
duce principal. 
Id. 
 44. Letter from Paul A. Smith, Senior Counsel, Am. Bankers Ass’n, to David D. Gibbons, 
Deputy Comptroller for Credit Risk, Office of the Comptroller of Currency, et al. 2  
(Sept. 23, 2002), available at http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/DC65CE12-B1C7-11D4-AB4A-
00508B95258D/26583/CreditCardLendingGuidancefinalcmt9230993.pdf; see also Letter on Behalf 
of the Financial Services Roundtable (Sept. 23, 2002) (on file with author). 
 45. Letter from Paul A. Smith to David G. Gibbons et al., supra note 44, at 4, 5. 
 46. Id. at 5. 
 47. Id. at 6. 
 48. Letter on Behalf of the Financial Services Roundtable, supra note 44, at 2. 
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repaid over the life of the loan.49 The adjustable rate mortgages that have, 
with low interest rates, made homes affordable to so many also put borrow-
ers at risk for increases in monthly payments of between 50% and 90%, 
should interest rates rise, and over the last two years, the number of home-
loan workouts nationally has increased from 155,495 over the entire year of 
2004 to 89,741 in the first quarter of 2005 alone.50 Online businesses now 
offer homeowners workout services and advice,51 and large banks advertise 
on their websites that they will explore the full variety of workout strategies 
before foreclosing.52 Just as with credit-card debt workouts, the need for 
home-loan workouts has seemed most acute with higher risk, subprime 
loans.53 Indeed, Fannie Mae, whose statutory mission is to facilitate home-
ownership by low- and middle-income families, has proclaimed a goal of 
working out mortgages with all of its borrowers “who run into trouble on 
their mortgages because of some temporary hardship, such as illness or un-
employment,” and states that in 2003, it completed workouts on fully one 
half of all its “troubled” loans.54 The state of Massachusetts’s Neighborhood 
Housing Rehabilitation Loan Program, which has the goal of making home-
improvement loans to low- and moderate-income property owners, states 
that “[f]oreclosure should be viewed as a final option, and only when all 
other reasonable alternatives have failed,” and has detailed guidelines on 
types of workout agreements that should be negotiated.55 
                                                                                                                      
 49. See The Federal Housing Administration Single Family Program Property Disposition: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. 
Serv., 105th Cong. (Apr. 1, 1998) (Statement of Michael A. Quinn, Senior Vice President, Credit Loss 
Management, Fannie Mae), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/banking/4198quin.htm (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2005) (describing home-loan workouts).  
 50. Terri Cullen, “Workout” to Prevent Home Foreclosures, Real Estate J., July 22, 2005, 
http://www.realestatejournal.com/buysell/mortgages/20050722-cullen.html. 
 51. See, e.g., Foreclosureaid.com, http://www.foreclosureaid.com (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) 
(proclaiming itself the “[l]eading [f]oreclosures [s]ite on the [n]et”); Steven Wolpern, A Basic 
Guide to Families Facing Foreclosure, Dollar Stretcher, http://www.stretcher.com/stories/ 
990517m.cfm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).  
 52. For an example of large lenders’ promises, see Ameriquest Mortgage Co., Ameriquest’s 
“Best Practices” Policy, http://www.ameriquestmortgage.com/press.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) 
(“We want customers to stay in their homes. Specially trained home retention-associates [sic] evalu-
ate all loans before the foreclosure process begins to ensure that a variety of workout options have 
been explored. Their sole responsibility is to make home retention strategies work.”), and  
Wells Fargo, Responsible Lending for Non-Prime U.S. Real Estate Loans, http:// 
financial.wellsfargo.com/responsible (last visited Nov. 20, 2005) (“We work diligently using our 
workout and repayment plans to help bring accounts current and mitigate losses.”). 
 53. Wells Fargo, supra note 52. 
 54. Fannie Mae, Expanding the American Dream Commitment, http://www.fanniemae.com/ 
initiatives/adc/index.jhtml?p=Initiatives&s=Expanding+the+American+Dream+Commitment (last vis-
ited Nov. 28, 2005). 
 55. Neighborhood Hous. Servs., Mass. Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. Dev., Delinquency 
Policies and Procedures Guide, available at http://www.mass.gov/dhcd/components/cs/ 
1PrgApps/NHS/DelProGd.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2005). 
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D. The Rent-to-Own Industry 
A final example is provided by the rent-to-own industry. The rent-to-
own business has grown from its beginnings in the 1960s to become a sig-
nificant part of the American retailing market, with at least 8,000 stores in 
the United States generating revenues of over $5 billion.56 In a typical rent-
to-own contract, in exchange for paying a monthly or weekly rental fee, a 
consumer gets immediate possession of a durable good, such as an electric 
appliance, plus delivery, set up, and service without any down payment or 
credit check. At the end of each monthly (or weekly) period, the consumer 
can return the goods to the store without any further obligation. Consumers 
can also obtain ownership of the goods, either by paying rent for a specified 
period of time (usually eighteen to twenty-four months) or by making early 
payment of a fraction (usually 50–60%) of the remaining lease payments. If 
a consumer acquires ownership by making payments over the entire eight-
een-to-twenty-four-month term, she will typically have paid two, three or 
even a higher multiple of retail price.57 
Consumer advocates have criticized the high prices and other terms of 
rent-to-own contracts as exploiting low-income consumers. The industry has 
rebutted by arguing that the high prices are necessary to cover the costly 
services provided to rent-to-own customers, the cost of allowing consumers 
to return the merchandise at any time, and the high risk of doing business 
with customers who are poor credit risks and who have provided no down 
payment. Consumer advocates have attempted to get federal legislation 
passed that would regulate rent-to-own contracts as a form of consumer-
installment contract.58 Since rent-to-own contracts do give consumers the 
option of simply using and then returning the merchandise, they are not con-
tracts in which consumers necessarily acquire title to goods by making 
payments over time, and so they are not, strictly-speaking, installment con-
tracts. On the other hand, rent-to-own consumers do have the option of 
buying goods over a period of time, and so to this extent, these contracts do 
appear to be functionally the same as installment contracts. The hybrid na-
ture of rent-to-own contracts has triggered an empirical debate over the 
relative frequency of rent-to-own consumer purchase versus return, with a 
2000 Federal Trade Commission study finding that the majority of rent-to-
own customers intend to and do buy the goods, while studies based on in-
                                                                                                                      
 56. James M. Lacko et al., Customer Experience with Rent-to-Own Transactions, 21 J. Pub. 
Pol’y & Marketing 126 (2002). The description of the rent-to-own contract that follows is also 
drawn from this article. 
 57. See Brian J. Zikmund-Fisher & Andrew M. Parker, Demand for Rent-to-Own Contracts: 
A Behavioral Economic Explanation, 38 J. Econ. Behavior & Org. 199, 201 (1999) (based on 
their survey and existing evidence, rent-to-own purchase payments are generally two to four times 
the purchase price with an implicit interest rate well over 100%; demand for rent-to-own even at 
these prices is a response by low- and moderate-income consumers to income and expense shocks 
and also a personal financial management tool to overcome myopic preferences).  
 58. See Alix M. Freedman, Peddling Dreams: A Marketing Giant Uses Its Sales Prowess to 
Profit on Poverty, Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1993, at A1. 
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dustry data find that most customers rent but do not buy.59 State courts in 
Minnesota, Wisconsin, and New Jersey have not waited for the empirical 
evidence and have simply ruled that rent-to-own transactions in those states 
are consumer-credit sales governed by their state consumer-credit-sales 
laws. The rent-to-own industry has reacted by introducing federal legislation 
that would preempt such state law decisions by declaring that nowhere are 
rent-to-own transactions a form of consumer-credit sale.60 
What is most important about rent-to-own contracts for my purposes is 
that in the midst of this battle over precisely how and if rent-to-own con-
tracts should be regulated, there are two key points of consensus among 
both industry and independent observers: that the vast majority of rent-to-
own customers are indeed poor or middle-income, but that when consumers 
are late in making their rental payments (as have roughly half), the vast ma-
jority have felt that the treatment they received in dealing with the late 
payment situation was either “very good” or “good.”61 Indeed, a common 
practice in the rent-to-own industry is to give store managers the discretion 
to forgive renters who fall behind on their payments and to work out repay-
ment plans so as to keep the business of valuable customers.  
E. Retail Sales Return Policies  
Legally, a consumer’s default contract with a retail seller is caveat emp-
tor, and the customer has no right to return items for a refund of the 
purchase price.62 However, the vast majority of large retailers have varied the 
default by adopting a standard-form policy that grants consumers a right of 
return. Until recently, retailers also generally granted their on-the-ground 
                                                                                                                      
 59. Compare James M. Lacko et al., Fed. Trade Comm’n, Survey of Rent-to-Own 
Customers (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/renttoown/renttoownr.pdf; Lacko et. al., 
supra note 56; and Signe-Mary McKernan et al., Empirical Evidence on the Determinants of Rent-
to-Own Use and Purchase Behavior, 17 Econ. Dev. Q. 22 (2003); with Michael H. Anderson & 
Raymond Jackson, A Consideration of Rent-to-Own, 35 J. Consumer Affairs 295 (2001), and 
Michael H. Anderson & Raymond Jackson, Rent-to-Own Agreements: Purchases or Rentals? (U. 
Mass. Dartmouth, 2003), available at http://www.apro-rto.com/legalchannel/pdfs/studies/ 
JABR_paper.pdf. 
 60. For a discussion of the state decisions and proposed federal legislation, see Ed Winn III, 
Capitol Steps, Progressive Rentals, July-Aug. 2004, at 31; Ed Winn III, States vs. Feds: Preemp-
tion Demystified, Progressive Rentals, May-June, 2003, at 46; and Ed Winn III, The Hill is Alive 
with the Sound of RTO, Progressive Rentals, July-Aug. 2002, at 35.  
 61. See Lacko et al., supra note 56, at 133; McKernan et. al., supra note 59, at 34. Thus it 
would be a grave error to take the furniture company in Williams v. Walker Thomas Funiture Co.—
which had filed close to one hundred writs of replevin each year for a decade prior to that litigation, 
Eben Colby, What did the Doctrine of Unconscionability do to the Walker-Thomas Furniture Com-
pany?, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 625, 656 (2002)—as representative of the average rent-to-own firm today. 
This is yet another instance of the well-known unrepresentativeness of legal disputes that generate 
published appellate opinions, and a caution against basing legal reforms on the very unusual facts of 
such disputes.  
 62. In New York, for example, retail stores may establish and enforce a no-cash and no-
credit-card refund policy, but the retailer must announce its policy with “conspicuous signs” visible 
from each cash register or from the store entrance for the policy to be enforceable under state con-
sumer protection statutes. See Baker v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, 673 N.Y.S.2d 281, 283 
(N.Y. City Ct. 1998). 
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employees vast amounts of discretion in liberalizing their official return 
policies so as to please consumers. So much discretion, however, that oppor-
tunistic consumers were taking advantage of the liberal return policies to 
obtain free product rentals. Retail-return policies thus not only dramatically 
illustrate the reality and significance of two-part standard-form contracts, 
but also how the profitability of such contracts depends crucially upon the 
ability of employees to screen for consumer type. 
Return policies appear to run the gamut, both in whether they impose re-
turn costs and processing fees on the consumer and in time limits and 
product restrictions (for example, returns may be allowed only if product 
packaging is unopened).63 Wal-Mart has a “satisfaction guaranteed” policy 
that allows consumers to return anything at virtually anytime, with or with-
out receipt, and get back the full amount of purchase, while Saks Fifth 
Avenue has a policy granting a full refund of the purchase price only if the 
item is returned within sixty days in a “saleable condition” with proof of 
purchase.64 Official return policies are not easy to enforce, however, and as 
actually implemented by on-the-ground employees, many retailers’ official 
return policies have become ones of “liberal and almost unlimited returns,” 
with consumers often given a full refund even without proof of purchase.65 
So liberal have return policies become that in the consumer electronics area, 
over seventy percent of products returned were found to have “no significant 
defect.”66 
Return policies clearly and dramatically illustrate both the advantages 
and disadvantages of the firm strategy of giving employees the discretion to 
expand upon standard-form customer rights. Even though a consumer may 
have no idea what a retailer’s formal return policy may be,67 consumers 
clearly like liberal return practices such as allowing long return periods, giv-
ing cash rather than just store credit, and allowing for the return even of sale 
items.68 A recent poll found that 91% of customers considered return poli-
cies and processes as very important to their decision about where to make a 
purchase69 (though only about 25% of customers make returns at all).70 Lib-
                                                                                                                      
 63. Stacy L. Wood, Remote Purchase Environments: The Influence of Return Policy Leniency 
on Two-Stage Decision Processes, 38 J. Mktg. Res. 157, 159 (2001). 
 64. See Charles Passy, Cranky Consumer: Get Set for Many Unhappy Returns, Wall St. J., 
Nov. 12, 2002, at D2; see also Lisa Kalis, Catalog Critic: Bathrobes Get the Spa Treatment, Wall 
St. J., Aug. 20, 2004, at W4 (reviewing sellers of high-end, spa-quality bathrobes whose return 
periods vary from thirty to ninety days). 
 65. Tony Sciarrotta, How Philips Reduced Returns, 7 Supply Chain Mgmt. Rev. 32, 33 (2003). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 36 (discussing new policies by retailers, such as posting their return policy in plain 
sight of consumers). 
 68. Wood, supra note 63, at 157.  
 69. See Evan Schuman, The War Against Retail Return Abuses, eWeek, Dec. 17, 2004, 
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1743671,00.asp; see also Michele Chandler, Retail Return 
Fraud Wearing Thin: Technology Helps Weed Out Abusers, Messenger-Inquirer, Mar. 13, 2005, 
http://www.messenger-inquirer.com/features/business/8207494.htm. 
 70. Schuman, supra note 69. 
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eral returns are thus a way for retailers to keep consumers happy,71 thereby 
generating repeat business and positive word-of-mouth.72  
Liberal returns practices are also, however, subject to abuse by oppor-
tunistic consumers who “buy,” use and then return a product, thus obtaining 
what is essentially a free product rental.73 Such consumer abuse is hugely 
costly not only to retailers, but also to product manufacturers, who end up 
stuck with products that are not defective and whose secondary market value 
is only a fraction of product cost.74 To reduce such customer abuse, retailers 
have recently undertaken measures to both identify and refuse return re-
quests by opportunistic consumers and to limit employee discretion in 
granting returns. Retailers such as Kmart and Target have started to strictly 
enforce their standard-form policy of granting returns within the specified 
return period and only if the customer has the product receipt.75 Retailers 
have begun to implement point-of-sale information systems that allow them 
to quickly identify repeat returners.76 A company called The Return Ex-
change77 has created a Windows-based SQL-Server database that creates 
customized rules to identify customers whose buying patterns make them 
look like return abusers. The system works as follows: when a customer 
attempts to return a product, the clerk asks for identification and enters that 
information (via the magnetic stripe on drivers’ licenses) into a company-
wide system. The data is automatically sent to The Return Exchange’s 
server. The profile of a potential return abuser is based on complicated algo-
rithms that are customized for each client, and is based on characteristics 
like time, duration, dollar amount, and frequency of return behavior. If the 
database spots abuse, it will send back a signal denying the return.78 The 
technology is being used by Guess, Express, Sports Authority, Staples, and 
                                                                                                                      
 71. There has long been clear evidence that firms generally respond to consumers’ product 
complaints in ways that consumers consider to be satisfactory. See Jean Braucher, An Informal 
Resolution Model of Consumer Product Warranty Law, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 1405, 1447–57. For more 
formal models of how firms use return policies to lower the consumer’s risk of buying a defective 
product and thereby keep the business of high value, repeat consumers, see Yeon-Koo Che, Cus-
tomer Return Policies for Experience Goods, 44 J. Indus. Econ. 17 (1996) and Claes Fornell & 
Birger Wernerfelt, A Model for Customer Complaint Management, 7 Market. Sci. 287 (1988).  
 72. For evidence on how customer satisfaction generally leads to repeat business and positive 
word-of-mouth communications, see Amy Wong & Amrik Sohal, A Critical Incident Approach to 
the Examination of Customer Relationship Management in a Retail Chain: An Exploratory Study, 6 
Qual. Mkt. Res. 248, 249 (2003). 
 73. See sources cited supra note 66. 
 74. See Sciarrotta, supra note 65, at 33 (recounting how on DVDs sold at liquidators, Philips 
was recovering only 20 to 30 cents per dollar of factory costs). My focus here is on retailer-return 
policies, but those policies are of course directly affected by manufacturer-return policies. There is a 
quite substantial theoretical literature demonstrating how, by accepting retailer returns, a manufac-
turer lowers retailer risk and can induce retailers to more truthfully reveal information about the 
actual strength of consumer product demand. See, e.g., Anil Arya & Brian Mittendorf, Using Return 
Policies to Elicit Retailer Information, 35 Rand J. Econ. 617 (2004). 
 75. Sciarrotta, supra note 65, at 36. 
 76. Id. at 37. 
 77. The Return Exchange, http://www.returnexchange.com (last visited Nov. 20, 2005). 
 78. Schuman, supra note 69. 
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KB Toys.79 At the end of the day, says The Retail Exchange, it rejects only 
one-tenth of one percent of all the reviewed returns.80 
While as I explain in more detail below, the way that stores have re-
sponded to return policy abuse makes consumers better off—by generating 
lower prices and better service—like other negotiating practices, it has be-
come a target for regulation. Senator Schumer of New York has argued that 
the practice amounts to blacklisting customers who return “a bit too much,” 
and is proposing to restrict the practice or make stores state the qualifica-
tions for “blacklisting” up front.81 It is also being criticized and tracked by 
privacy rights groups.82  
F. Only the Tip of the Iceberg: Can Everything Be Renegotiated? 
The standard-form contracting situations that I have discussed above are 
those where there is at least some systematic evidence for the frequency of 
the two-part standard-form contract. The practice is, however, almost surely 
not confined to these particular industries or transactions. Most consumer 
goods are sold on a fixed- or posted-price basis, and it is typically assumed 
by legal scholars that consumers do not negotiate over price. Yet there is 
clear evidence that during economic recessions, sharp consumers recognize 
and seize the opportunity to bargain over price and payment terms (cash 
versus credit) for consumer durables.83 A fascinating recent journalistic ex-
periment, moreover, indicates that bargaining around standard-form terms 
and policies may be a very general and widespread possibility.84 For three 
months, freelance journalist Tom Chiarella attempted to negotiate over price 
and terms on every transaction he engaged in, from the smallest—buying a 
hot dog from a street vendor—to the largest—replacing a lost remote rental 
car key that was originally supposed to cost $1200 to replace. What 
Chiarella found was that while some prices are indeed fixed, other terms—
such as the $1200 cost replacing the remote automobile key—can be negoti-
ated. Indeed, by working his way up the managerial chain, and eventually 
reaching the regional manager, he succeeded not only in avoiding the $1200 
replacement cost but in getting a two-week rental for free. While obviously 
anecdotal, this journalistic experience dramatically depicts bargaining 
around standard-form terms and policies: by incurring the costs of negotiat-
ing, the consumer eventually reaches an employee with the discretion to 
                                                                                                                      
 79. Chandler, supra note 69. 
 80. Schuman, supra note 69. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See, e.g., Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Alert: The Return Exchange—Have You Been 
Denied the Ability to Make Returns or Exchanges with Large Retailers? We Want to Know (Nov. 
17, 2004), http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ReturnExchange.htm. 
 83. Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, Let’s Make a Deal: A Buyer’s Market Has Shoppers Demanding 
and Getting Discounts, Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1991, at A1. 
 84. Tom Chiarella, Haggling for Hot Dogs (and Other Real-Life Adventures in the Neglected 
Art of Negotiation), Esquire, Feb. 2005, at 115. 
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decide that the consumer’s loyalty and future business is sufficiently valu-
able that a departure from standard terms is in the firm’s economic interest. 
III. Explaining Observed Behavior: Designing Standard- 
Form Terms that Are Meant to Be Forgiven 
In all of the empirical examples, a business uses a standard-form con-
tract that establishes a clear, bright-line obligation, but the business gives its 
supervisory employees the discretion to do more for the customer than the 
standard-form obligations require. A very strong economic logic motivates 
this very common contracting practice: the desire of firms to maximize not 
only short-term profits, but also long-term value.  
Growing earnings over time requires either continually decreasing costs 
and/or continually increasing revenues. On the revenue side, growth comes 
from increasing sales, either by getting existing customers to buy more or by 
attracting new customers. While decreasing the price of a product or service 
is sometimes crucial to growing revenues, for firms who produce differenti-
ated products and services (which is by far and away most firms), the real 
key to growing revenues is to continually improve the quality of the product 
or service they offer, and to do so in a way that attracts new customers while 
not causing the loss or defection of existing customers. The strategy of al-
lowing employees the discretion to grant case-specific benefits beyond those 
that are required by the standard-form contract can be seen to be a sophisti-
cated way for the firm to grow its revenues by gaining the loyalty of existing 
customers and establishing a good reputation that will attract new custom-
ers. There are in fact two slightly different aspects to this strategy. These are 
captured by the examples set out earlier, which actually comprise two dif-
ferent situations. In the first, the good or service provided was not up to the 
customer’s expectation, and the customer complains seeking some kind of 
compensation from the provider. I shall refer to this as the strategy of award-
ing discretionary benefits. In the second type of case, the customer has not 
lived up to her obligations under the standard-form contract, but the pro-
vider forgives her technical breach and renegotiates. I shall refer to this as 
the strategy of discretionary forgiveness.85  
                                                                                                                      
 85. There is an interesting contrast between the pattern that I explain in this section—one 
where firms intentionally adopt relatively clear, bright-line standard-form terms which they intend to 
bargain around—and the pattern that Bernstein found in the cotton industry, where cotton merchants 
and traders work out their problems cooperatively subject to bright-line industry trade rules. Bern-
stein, supra note 1, at 1732–35, 1776–81. Unlike Bernstein’s cotton-industry norms, which are 
driven by the desire of industry participants to develop and maintain good reputations for efficiently 
performing and resolving disputes, the incentive for firms to negotiate around bright-line terms is 
driven by the desire to attract some kinds of consumers and to avoid others, a more precise screen-
ing function than is apparent in Bernstein’s study of the cotton industry. There are some similarities 
between my analysis and that presented by Bebchuk and Posner in this volume, and I note these at 
various points below. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive 
Consumer Markets, 104 Mich. L. Rev 827 (2006). Gilo and Porat believe, as do Bebchuk and Pos-
ner and I, that standard-form contracts are important instruments for firms to screen or select 
different consumer types, but they believe, contrary in my view to the existing evidence, that stan-
dard-form terms themselves confer precise benefits on consumers who have the sophistication to 
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A. Discretionary Forgiveness as Ex-post Customer Screening 
The key to understanding why a firm can benefit by allowing its em-
ployees to forgive some customers’ contract breaches lies in the recognition 
that not all existing customers are worth keeping. Some consumers are hon-
est, some are not. Some consumers have a highly secure economic base and 
ability to pay, while others have jobs and income flows that are much more 
uncertain. An opportunistic consumer who really wants a new coat may de-
liberately damage the coat if she thinks that she’ll get a discount that makes 
the coat affordable by so doing; an honest consumer may unknowingly se-
lect a damaged coat from the rack. A naïve consumer may run up enormous 
credit-card bills and be surprised to learn that she has accumulated a repay-
ment obligation that she cannot carry; a more sophisticated (and wealthier) 
consumer may use her credit card only for the convenience of cashless 
monthly interest-free loans. An honest patient may fully expect to pay her 
hospital bills but lose her job; an opportunistic patient may demand a medi-
cal procedure today, even though she knows that she cannot pay for it.  
A firm interested in steadily growing its earnings will seek to build and 
maintain relationships with good customers and to avoid or terminate rela-
tionships with bad customers. It will seek, in other words, to build a loyal 
and profitable customer base.86 As the credit-card companies stated in their 
trade association’s formal response to the 2002 Draft Guidance, the overrid-
ing business goal of consumer lenders is to build and retain a profitable, 
long-term relationship, and the best way to do so is to get customers “back 
on track with a repayment agreement with a low probability of default.”87 
The strategy of adopting bright-line standard-form terms and then grant-
ing discretionary forgiveness allows businesses to identify or screen for 
good, high-value customers under circumstances when they could not do so 
with the contract term itself. To see why this is so, consider the very impor-
tant example of repayment terms. Lenders and creditors more generally 
renegotiate these when their employees have determined that there is a good 
reason for the borrower’s failure to make timely payment. A “good” reason 
is something beyond the borrower’s control, such as an illness or loss of a 
job (or for a business, a sudden downturn in market conditions). A borrower 
who has fallen behind only because of such an unusual and extraordinary 
event is a valuable customer, someone who is basically a very good credit 
risk and on whom the lender will on average make money. 
                                                                                                                      
read them, so that standard-form terms are themselves used to screen consumers. David Gilo & 
Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate in Standard-Form Contracts, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 983 
(2006). In my model, precisely the opposite is true: standard-form terms offer little, and firms then 
allow their employees to exercise discretion in identifying those consumers with respect to whom it 
is profitable to go beyond standard-form obligations.  
 86  For empirical evidence that it is indeed those firms with large fixed capital and hence a 
large stake in building enduring customer relationships who are most interested in minimizing and 
responding cooperatively to customer complaints, see Sharon Oster, The Determinants of Consumer 
Complaints, 62 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 603 (1980).  
 87. Ken Maynard, Customer Service: The Key to Collection Success, Credit Mgmt., Oct. 
2003, at 44. 
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A lender can successfully screen for such “good” types by setting clear 
standard-form terms that are sometimes waived (or not enforced) when it 
could not do so by using a simple standard-form contract without renegotia-
tion. Suppose, for instance, that the lender eliminated its managers’ 
discretion to forgive and altered the standard-form terms to require a shorter 
repayment period and/or a higher interest rate. By demanding such harsh 
terms up front, in the standard-form contract, the lender would lose the 
business of “good,” lower-income borrowers who will keep their promises 
to make timely repayments while doing nothing to lose the business of 
“bad,” opportunistic borrowers who borrow with no intention of repaying on 
schedule. By the same reasoning, we can see the tradeoff that the lender 
confronts in arriving at the optimum, profit-maximizing combination of 
standard-form terms and discretionary forgiveness. On the one hand, the 
lower the standard-form interest rate and the longer the standard-form re-
payment period, the greater the number of good, honest borrowers who sign 
on and the lower the probability of costly, forgiving renegotiation with such 
borrowers. On the other hand, a lower interest rate and longer repayment 
period mean lower revenues from such borrowers. Conversely, were the 
lender to raise the interest rate and shorten the repayment period, it would 
increase revenues from good borrowers, but also decrease the proportion of 
good borrowers and increase the probability of costly renegotiation with 
good borrowers. The optimal terms result from solving this trade-off.88  
What necessitates the two-part contract—clear standard-form terms plus 
managerial discretion to renegotiate—is a fundamental economic problem 
known as adverse selection (or hidden information).89 Adverse selection re-
fers to the problem of designing a contract when the contract may attract 
different types of contracting parties—some honest, some opportunistic, for 
example—who bring correspondingly different costs and benefits to the 
relationship. Tailored forgiveness deals with the problem of hidden customer 
types. In dealing with the hidden type problem, tailored forgiveness is a sub-
stitute for ex-ante screening. That is, a firm that has tough standard-form 
terms and then delegates discretion to renegotiate when its managers believe 
that the customer has not behaved opportunistically does not have to worry 
so much about identifying opportunistic types before entering the contract. 
If it turns out that the customer behavior was indeed opportunistic, its man-
ager will insist upon adherence to the unforgiving standard-form terms. 
More concretely, under the two-part contract—standard-form terms plus 
discretionary forgiveness—a seller does not need to rely upon price and 
other standard-form terms to screen buyer types, and these terms will gener-
ally be more generous to the buyer than they would if the seller was denied 
the discretion to renegotiate. A lender, for example, will set a lower stated 
interest rate and more generous repayment terms than it would if denied the 
                                                                                                                      
 88. This result is demonstrated in the appendix. See infra App.  
 89. This important general result is due to Joseph Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing 
in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 393 (1981). 
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legal ability to use its discretion to forgive breach of the standard-form 
terms.90 
Interestingly, although economists have recognized the adverse selection 
problem confronting creditors and other providers of consumer goods and 
services, they have failed to discuss two-part contracts as a market solution 
to this problem. Rather than ex-post forgiving renegotiation, economists 
have focused on ex-ante mechanisms that creditors use to screen out bad 
credit risks, such as requiring collateral, or lending only to consumers with 
whom they have had ongoing personal contact (referred to generally in the 
lending context as “credit rationing”).91 Compared with ex-post renegotia-
tion, such ex-ante screening has the disadvantage of making it hard for 
“new” consumers—those without an established reputation—to obtain 
credit. Rather than screening ex ante on the basis of wealth or relationship, 
two-part contracts in effect say, “we do not know you, but we will give you 
a chance.” In this light, it is clear that two-part contracts serve a very impor-
tant social as well as economic function: they make it economically rational 
for creditors and other providers to do business with consumers who, be-
cause of their age, ethnicity or nationality, have not yet had an opportunity 
to establish either accumulated wealth or valuable personal relationships.  
B. Individualized versus Algorithmic Renegotiation 
In the several empirically important examples discussed above, the seller 
or lender does not incur the high cost of having its employees individually 
renegotiate forgiveness, but rather relies upon general rules of thumb or al-
gorithms that all employees use in determining whether or not to forgive 
breach. Indeed, the credit-card industry, in its highly negative reaction to 
recent regulatory guidance, complained that the guidance both required 
costly individualized renegotiations while also seeming to set up bright-line 
rules for the terms of those negotiations (such as requiring that repayments 
be made within forty-eight months).92  
On my analysis, there is no reason for regulators to insist upon such in-
dividualized bargaining at the forgiveness stage of a two-part standard-form 
contract. After all, a seller or lender is using the second stage to determine 
whether or not the buyer or borrower is or is not worth keeping as a cus-
tomer. The entire point of the two-part contract is to efficiently get 
information about a buyer or borrower type, and efficiency in information 
acquisition necessarily involves a trade-off between accuracy and cost. From 
                                                                                                                      
 90. Note that even if firms are able to quite accurately assess consumer type at the negotia-
tion stage, it may be that courts are unable to verify consumer type. This problem—types are 
privately observable but not verifiable to third party enforcers—is a standard law-and-economics 
explanation for contractual incompleteness. I discuss in some detail below the limits to judicial 
verification of both consumer and firm opportunism, but my basic approach is to presume that con-
sumer opportunism is not verifiable and so firms have to solve it on their own.  
 91. See, for example, DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: 
THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 104-05 (2d ed. 2005). 
 92. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. 
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the evidence discussed earlier, providers that have a relatively small number 
of accounts to manage—such as hospitals—seem to find it economic to en-
gage in a more individualized forgiveness93 renegotiation than do 
providers—such as credit-card issuers—who have millions of accounts and 
rely upon generalized algorithms that, for instance, extend additional credit 
x number of times automatically.94 In reasonably competitive markets, the 
lower the cost of forgiveness, the better off both the provider and its con-
sumer clients are. 
Were regulators to make it too costly for providers to engage in ex-post 
forgiveness, they might well make the two-part contract uneconomic for 
providers. As just argued, if restricted to a one-part contract in which only 
price and other standard-form terms may be used to screen customer types, 
it is on my analysis very likely that providers would increase price and 
toughen payment terms. Thus as the credit-card issuers argued, adoption of 
regulations that make forgiveness of late or inadequate payments too costly 
would indeed likely cause a “number” of institutions to stop making new 
credit loans to subprime borrowers, thus restricting credit availability to 
many low- and moderate-income families.95 
C. Discretionary Benefits and the Potential Instability of Consumer 
Screening through Two-Part Standard-Form Contracts 
Another version of the two-part contract involves the awarding of discre-
tionary ex-post customer benefits. For many firms, the most important type 
of customer to keep happy is the customer who is relatively knowledgeable, 
persuasive, and strategic—a sharp bargainer. Such customers are likely to be 
a lucrative source of repeat business if they remain satisfied with the firm’s 
services. By the same token, if they terminate their relationships with the 
firm because they are dissatisfied with the quality of the firm’s services, they 
are likely to be an especially influential source of negative word-of-mouth 
advertising. Such customers are also more likely to complain than is the 
typical customer. The strategy of allowing its employees to respond to such 
complaints with various forms of compensatory benefits is a cost-
minimizing way for the firm to increase the probability that it will keep the 
business of such consumers. By waiting for the consumer to make the first 
move—by complaining—the company effectively lets the high-value, high-
information consumers identify themselves. That is, the consumers who will 
complain most often and loudest are presumably those who are most incon-
venienced by the failure of the product or service to meet their expectations. 
Other consumers may not even be aware of the possibility of obtaining  
relief by complaining to the company. Rather than seeking out customer 
                                                                                                                      
 93. See supra Part II.A. 
 94. See supra Part II.B. 
 95. Letter on behalf of the Financial Services Roundtable, supra note 44, at 2. 
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complaints, a policy of awarding complaint-based benefits allows the com-
pany to satisfy those consumers who are most demanding.  
Under the economic terminology introduced above, awarding com-
plaint-based benefits is a strategy to deal with the hidden type problem that 
the firm faces when customers differ in their sophistication and in the value 
they attach to the firm’s performance. Simply put, the firm would like to 
attract and keep the business of high-value, high-sophistication customers 
without giving every customer the same benefits as it gives these high de-
manders. That is, were the benefits extended to complaining high-value 
customers part of the firm’s standard-form package, the firm would have 
needlessly increased its costs by offering benefits to lots of customers who 
do not expect them and who would buy the firm’s product or service regard-
less of whether those benefits were offered.  
As for the demanding consumers, it is theoretically possible that they 
would be better off with a more expensive, higher-quality good or service. 
However, when sophisticated, demanding consumers are in a minority and 
there are lots of naïve, uncomplaining consumers, then the price of the lower 
quality good or service may be low enough so that the sophisticated con-
sumers are better off with the lower quality good (plus complaint-based 
compensation when things go wrong), than they would be with the higher-
quality, higher-price good. When these conditions hold, the complaint-based 
benefits strategy not only allows the firm to retain and add sophisticated, 
influential customers, but effectively gives those customers a price subsidy 
that is paid for by less-well-informed, or simply more acquiescent, consum-
ers.96 
By this same token, however, the complaint-based benefits strategy cre-
ates an opportunity for new firms to enter and offer the good or service on a 
simple one-part contract that offers no discretionary benefits but charges a 
lower price.97 Since by hypothesis low-value consumers do not demand dis-
cretionary benefits, the simple, low-price contract will give them the same 
good or service as they receive under the two-part contract, but at a lower 
price. Hence, such a contract will attract the business of all the low-value 
consumers. The entry into the market of low-price, “no-frills” providers will 
destroy the cross-subsidy offered by the two-part contract, and with such 
entry, that market may segment into low-price, no-frills providers and high-
price, quality providers. In such a segmented equilibrium, there will no 
longer be any reason to use bargaining around the standard form, no frills 
terms to screen out high-value consumers. 
                                                                                                                      
 96. To see this, suppose that it costs the firm an amount c to provide the basic good or ser-
vice, but an extra amount f to provide frills demanded by a high-value type, and let the probability of 
a low-value consumer be q, while the probability of high-value-consumer type is then (1 – q). Under 
a strategy of granting frills only when the consumer reveals herself to be a high-value type, the 
firm’s expected costs, which will equal price, p, under competition, are given by qc + (1 –q)(c + f) 
= c + (1 – q)f = p. Hence the price p both above the cost c of servicing low-value consumers and 
below the cost (c + f) of servicing high-value consumers. 
 97. That is, using the notation set out above, supra note 96, a competitive contract of this 
form sets p = c. 
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In some markets precisely such a phenomenon seems to have occurred. 
Higher-cost, higher-price “legacy” airlines such as American Airlines and 
Delta have for some time used optional first-class upgrades and other tools 
to identify and compensate valuable customers. The Travel Insider reports 
that “airlines have become very much more sophisticated in how they han-
dle their first class seats” by using information technology to identify 
valuable customers: “with the great deal of information now on [gate] 
agents’ computer screens about each individual passenger, the fare they 
paid, and their frequent flier status, [airlines now] have set procedures for 
who gets upgraded first and who gets upgraded last . . . .”98 Before informa-
tion was available to gate agents, they “truly could close their eyes and 
choose passengers, seemingly at random” for upgrades.99 Now, however, 
agents “are expected to follow set procedures if/when upgrading for free.”100 
“Because of these extra procedures and extra information,” continues the 
article, “it is much harder for people to get themselves pushed up the up-
grade eligibility list unless they have a valid entitlement to enhanced 
status.”101  
Such a strategy of discretionary benefits may please high-value frequent 
airline travelers, but it provides no benefits to low-value passengers. Follow-
ing the lead of Southwest Airlines, during the 1990s a number of low-price, 
no-frills carriers entered the market and targeted precisely such low-value 
passengers. Such carriers offer no discretionary benefits such as upgrades, 
but they do offer very low prices. Predictably, they have attracted a large 
number of customers and have placed enormous pressure on the pricing 
strategies of legacy carriers. 
As this example shows, market structure imposes quite definite limits on 
the ability of firms to use the two-part standard-form contracting strategy as 
a way of screening for high-value customers. Unless there are barriers to 
entry, or consumers have very high switching costs, the discretionary-
benefits strategy will be undermined by the entry of no-frills, low-price pro-
viders.102 This analysis thus generates the sharp empirical implication that 
                                                                                                                      
 98. Free Fist Class Upgrade—Fantasy or Fact?, Travel Insider, Feb. 19, 2005, 
http://www.thetravelinsider.info/2003/0228.htm.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. (emphasis added). The article continues, “Almost without exception, if an airline is 
going to give away empty first class seats, they will start off with their ‘best’ frequent fliers and/or 
the people that paid the highest fares.” Id. Observe that just as providers have an interest in lowering 
the transaction costs of discretionary forgiveness, so too do they have an interest in finding algo-
rithms and rules of thumb that effectively and cheaply discriminate among customers in granting 
discretionary benefits. As the legacy carriers’ practices illustrate, as computational speed and capac-
ity have increased, the algorithms available to firms for such ex-post screening use increasingly 
detailed and accurate customer-specific information. As a consequence, firms can rely on informa-
tion about customer value that they have directly collected and need rely less on customer 
complaints as a signal of customer type. 
 102. Discretionary benefits are in this important sense quite different than the case of 
shrouded costs considered by Gabaix and Laibson. See Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded 
Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. Econ. 
(forthcoming Aug. 2006), available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=527. 
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the two-part standard-form contracting practice should exhibit long-term 
survival only in industries that are relatively noncompetitive.  
This does not, however, imply that it is only in such relatively non-
competitive industries that we will observe such a contracting strategy. Even 
if undermined from below, as it were, by the entry of no-frills providers, the 
discretionary-benefits strategy may have been a valuable, albeit temporary, 
instrument for firms. The strategy allows firms to identify and attract high-
value, sophisticated consumers. Hence even if firms using such a strategy 
eventually lose their low-value consumers to low-price, no-frills entrants, 
the discretionary benefits strategy may well have accelerated growth in firm 
size and sales for a number of years, thus increasing the firm’s stock market 
value. The two-part strategy will also have given firms lots of information 
about high-value consumers, information that firms can use in devising new 
price and nonprice strategies designed to keep the business and maximize 
revenues from such high-value consumers.  
IV. The Value of Discretion: Distributional  
Issues in the Regulationof Standard-Form  
Contracts and Their Renegotiation 
An immediate implication of the preceding analysis is that the effect of 
laws or regulations mandating generous standard-form terms would be to 
replace a system in which firms extend a wide and trusting invitation and 
then enforce standard-form terms only against those whom its on-the-
ground managers have found to have violated that trust, with one in which 
firms use only attorney-drafted standard-form terms to control their expo-
sure to contractual risk. Such a move from individualized ex-post screening 
to crude ex-ante screening may well harm the very groups—such as gener-
ally poorer, economically disadvantaged racial minorities—that it was 
designed to help. 
On the other hand, mandating that firms offer generous terms in the ex-
ante standard-form contract, rather than allowing firms to exercise their dis-
cretion in determining when and whether to grant such terms ex post when 
problems arise, might well prevent the cross-subsidization of high-value, 
sophisticated consumers by low-value, less sophisticated consumers that is 
entailed by the discretionary strategy. That is, by mandating generous stan-
dard-form terms, the firm’s cost, and hence the competitive price, would 
increase. 
Such a price increase will almost surely be higher than the increase in 
value that any consumer type gets from the mandatory terms. The reason 
why this is so is crucial to understand, for it sharply distinguishes this analy-
sis of mandatory standard-form terms from earlier law-and-economics work 
on the topic. When the law mandates generous standard-form terms, it is 
                                                                                                                      
There, unsophisticated consumers subsidize sophisticated consumers because they pay supra-
competitive prices for add-on services that sophisticated consumers avoid, but there is no incentive 
for new firms to enter to steal the business of the unsophisticated consumers, because by assump-
tion, the unsophisticated do not realize that they will demand and buy the add-on services.  
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possible that it is giving low-value, low-sophistication consumers terms that 
they value at more than their cost, but which they did not get under the dis-
cretionary strategy because they lack the sophistication, or simple 
willingness, to complain and bargain ex post. However, if this is true, then it 
would seem that firms would have been better off simply offering and ad-
vertising the generous standard-form package in the first place. When, 
however, the firm promises all customers these generous terms, it has lost 
the ability to screen for customer opportunism.103 Such opportunism is 
costly. Hence when the firm sells a standard-form package with all the vari-
ous benefits and forgiving adjustments that it would otherwise have made on 
a discretionary basis under the tough standard-form contract, nonopportun-
istic customers must pay for the costs of opportunism that the firm can no 
longer control. While low-value, low-sophistication customers might indeed 
value discretionary benefits at more than they cost the firm when they are 
not opportunistically claimed, such customers may well not value the bene-
fits as highly as their cost to the firm when it can no longer control 
opportunistic claims. That is, in this model, the firm’s costs are endogenous, 
and they are systematically higher when being nice is required, so that the 
firm cannot control opportunistic claiming, than when being nice is discre-
tionary, so that it can control such opportunism.  
This is to argue that it is very likely that low-value, low-sophistication 
customers will be priced out of the market if policies that were discretionary 
with the firm become part of the firm’s standard-form obligations. It is true 
that when opportunism is not so serious as to price out the low-value, low-
sophistication customers, mandating generous standard-form terms may 
eliminate the cross-subsidization of high-value, highly sophisticated cus-
tomers by low-value, low-sophistication customers. All customers may end 
up getting the benefits that accrued only to the higher value customers under 
the discretionary strategy.  
Such a happy outcome is, however, not likely. For one thing, since op-
portunism becomes a more severe problem under mandatory generous 
standard-form terms, the firm will have a very strong incentive to instruct 
employees to behave in a non-cooperative fashion when customers bring 
complaints by insisting upon very narrow and legalistic interpretations of 
the firm’s superficially generous standard-form contractual obligations. 
Thus, whereas under the discretionary strategy high-value customers were 
met with an ex-post willingness to bargain, they will often encounter pre-
cisely the opposite, unreasonable insistence upon narrow interpretations of 
standard-form obligations, in the world of mandatory standard-form terms. 
This makes it much more likely that the high-value, high-sophistication 
types will drop out of the market for the firm’s product or service and switch 
their business to a more expensive higher-quality provider, a provider whose 
prices are so high that low-value, low-sophistication customers are not part 
of the market. In such a case, mandating generous standard-form terms may 
induce a kind of adverse selection; as higher-value customers drop out, and 
                                                                                                                      
 103. This insight is the basis for the analysis in Bebchuck & Posner, supra note 85, at 87–28. 
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the ostensibly generous standard-form terms offered to remaining low-value, 
low-sophistication customers are in practice degraded further and further.  
All of this analysis, moreover, presumes my conflation of high-value 
with high-sophistication. While it may be true that high-income, high-
education customers are the ones who get the benefits of the discretionary-
firm strategy, this is not necessarily the case.104 It might well be that it is the 
middle-income customer who is most familiar with and adept at bargaining 
with the firm when something goes wrong with her or the firm’s perform-
ance. High sophistication, this to say, may accompany middle or even low 
income. If this is so, then the tough standard form combined with discre-
tionary forgiveness strategy may be one which especially benefits customers 
who are keen but not wealthy. Indeed, it is precisely such customers, rather 
than high-wealth customers, who are likely to be most attracted to the prod-
ucts or services of a firm with relatively low prices and meager standard-
form promises but which will bargain when things go wrong. By the same 
token, it will be such smart but middle-income customers who will be most 
harmed by a legal rule mandating generous standard-form terms. 
V. Standard-Form Terms and the Doctrinal  
Control of Firm Opportunism 
A. The Complexity of Opportunism 
It may quite aptly be objected that opportunism cuts both ways, that just 
as consumers and employees might opportunistically invoke generous stan-
dard-form contractual rights, so too might opportunistic firms harshly and 
unfairly enforce harsh standard-form clauses. While this is indeed possible, 
such behavior would alienate and drive away customers. And if word-of-
mouth is indeed as important as many contemporary marketing experts in-
creasingly believe, by unfairly driving away their current customers, such 
firms would do much to ensure that they do not get future customers.105 
Thus, while firm opportunism cannot be ruled out as a general theoretical 
matter, it seems likely to be a potentially profitable strategy only where the 
firm is selling a good or service that consumers buy only very infrequently 
and in small quantity, and where the firm makes its sales in widely diffuse 
locations that are not part of the same consumer word-of-mouth network. 
Still, to call a firm that rigidly enforces the harsh terms of its standard-
form contracts opportunistic is to strain the meaning of the term. After all, 
                                                                                                                      
 104. This is similar to the point made by Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal 
Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 361, 377–80 
(1991) (arguing that if poor consumers attach low value both to a product and to a generous term 
such as a warranty, then they may be made worse off when the law mandates such a term, because 
high-value consumers drive up the price of the good by a large amount when the warranty is man-
dated). 
 105. See Bebchuck & Posner, supra note 85, at 829–30 (presuming that when firms are sensi-
tive to their market reputations, the problem for contract design is in controlling consumer, not firm, 
opportunism).  
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such a firm is just doing what it has a contractual right to do and is in a 
sense a much more straightforward actor than the firm that awards discre-
tionary forgiveness and discretionary benefits. Real firm opportunism would 
seem to consist not in being a literalist about form contract rights and obli-
gations, but in creating a false appearance of pursuing a policy of 
forgiveness or complaint-based benefits by mimicking the behavior of a firm 
that really does implement these strategies. The truly opportunistic firm 
would take steps to appear to pursue a nice, forgiving strategy, while even-
tually reneging on those promises for various technical or legalistic reasons 
that are burdensome or impossible for most consumers, even quite sophisti-
cated ones, to sort through. Indeed, a firm might be so successful in 
clouding and confusing the consumer as to its employment of such a strat-
egy that even existing customers are not aware of what has happened: they 
may actually believe that the firm has a legitimate reason for failing to for-
give or to respond to their complaints. 
If opportunistic firms are indeed successful in mimicking forgiving 
firms, their presence may eventually lower the incentive for firms to be for-
giving. This effect is somewhat complex. On the one hand, a legitimately 
good firm still pleases and retains its customers, who remain with it and 
inform other potential new customers. On the other hand, even a good firm 
sometimes fails to forgive (indeed, this is the way that consumer opportun-
ism is disciplined), and opportunistic consumers may spread bad, false news 
about good firms, news that is in general credible when there are some op-
portunistic firms in the overall market mix.  
B. Doctrinal Implications 
The possibility of good and bad types on both sides of the firm-
consumer divide raises an obvious question about the potential for laws and 
regulations to improve the performance of two-part standard-form contracts. 
My general answer to this question is that courts should support the stan-
dard-form, discretionary benefits/forgiveness market equilibrium. To get 
more precise prescriptions for judicial action (or inaction), the key thing to 
see about the market equilibrium is that in it, while all firms have very 
strong incentives to actually discipline customer opportunism, only those 
firms that are long-run players in the game and really seek to build lasting 
customer relationships have an incentive to actually confer discretionary 
benefits beyond what they have promised in their form contracts. 
For firms that are opportunistic short-run players, the second stage is too 
costly. Such opportunistic firms will instead rely upon the standard-form 
terms themselves to extract consumer rents, setting up standard-form terms 
that are onerous and then refusing to renegotiate them at all, or fraudulently 
promising but then failing to forgive. Indeed, and most seriously for the vi-
ability of socially desirable market equilibrium in two-part contracts, if 
firms could renege on promises to be forgiving of customer breach or to 
extend benefits to rectify customer disappointment with their own perform-
ance failures without customers actually being able to determine whether 
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the firm in fact has a valid legal reason for so doing, to in effect shroud their 
failures in complex legalese, then all firms would have an incentive to pur-
sue such a highly opportunistic strategy. The market equilibrium posited 
above would then unbundle. 
It is, unfortunately, far from clear that courts can do much to prevent 
such firm opportunism. One’s first thought might well be that courts could 
reduce firm opportunism by holding firms to their agents’ ex-post (that  
is, after the standard-form contract has been made) promises offering  
discretionary forgiveness or complaint-based benefits. Somewhat unconven-
tionally, the crucial legal doctrines in implementing this role are not those—
such as the unconscionability doctrine considered below—that get at 
whether the standard-form contract was itself in some sense fairly bargained 
for. They are instead doctrines governing the enforceability of relatively 
informal promises made apart from or in the process of renegotiating the 
standard-form contract. Candidate doctrines would include those determin-
ing the enforceability of an express warranty made outside a standard-form 
contract that by its terms excludes any such warranties and the enforceabil-
ity of an oral modification of a standard-form contract that by its terms 
precludes any such oral modification. 
It is possible that through such doctrines, courts could increase the cost 
to opportunistic firms of inducing consumers to make more payments by 
promising but failing to deliver discretionary benefits or forgiveness. But 
there are opportunistic consumers as well as firms.106 After all, the whole 
point of the strategy of discretionary benefits/forgiveness is to screen for 
opportunistic consumer types. Such opportunistic consumers are the ones to 
whom the firm will not promise forgiveness or extra benefits. But they are 
precisely the ones who will file lawsuits claiming that such promises were 
made when they in fact were not. If courts are prone to making errors in 
determining whether such promises were made, and in particular have a 
high probability of a false positive (finding a promise was made when one 
was not), then they increase the incentive for such opportunistic, bad-faith 
lawsuits. Substantive legal rules strongly impact the likelihood of such er-
rors. The legal fact-finder may well interpret evidence that the defendant 
firm has a general practice of giving its agents the discretion to forgive the 
breach of or go beyond promises contained in the standard-form contract as 
indicating that its agents did precisely that in this particular instance. Hence 
contract-law rules that presume that the terms of a present contract are af-
fected by prior course of dealing or past performance tend to facilitate 
plaintiff opportunism and raise the risk that a defendant firm will be errone-
ously held liable for a forgiving promise that it never made. If sufficiently 
likely, such erroneous ex-post liability may increase the cost to the firm of 
                                                                                                                      
 106. The importance of two-sided opportunism and opportunistic, bad-faith lawsuits cannot 
be overestimated. For an analytical treatment of two-sided opportunism and a discussion of how the 
possibility of bad-faith, opportunistic lawsuits figures in neoclassical economic analysis of the 
proper scope of legal rules protecting against contractual opportunism, see Jason Scott Johnston, 
Opting in and Opting out: Bargaining for Fiduciary Duties in Cooperative Ventures, 70 Wash. U. 
L.Q. 291, 301–08 (1992). 
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pursuing two-part standard-form contracts by so much that firms no longer 
allow discretionary forgiveness/benefits, thus destroying what is in general a 
socially desirable market outcome.  
This argument recommends that if courts are to get into the business of 
enforcing promises of discretionary forgiveness/benefits that are made after 
and go beyond standard-form obligations, then they should do so only if 
there is very strong evidence that the promise was in fact made. As I read 
the central cases, while some courts have followed this recommendation, 
others have been, if anything, too cautious in enforcing such promises. My 
analysis suggests that with sufficient evidentiary safeguards, oral misrepre-
sentations by a firm’s agent that deviate from standard-form contract terms 
are a form of opportunistic exploitation that should be deemed fraudulent 
and hence should constitute grounds for rescinding a contract. State high 
courts, however, appear to be split on the issue of whether general standard-
form merger clauses107 and/or language that disclaims reliance on oral repre-
sentations bar actions for fraud claiming that oral representations by the 
firm’s agents in fact induced such reliance.108 On my analysis, provided that 
the proof standard is sufficiently high, standard-form disclaimers and 
merger clauses should not bar proof that such oral representations were in-
deed made. Such an approach is precisely what courts have taken in dealing 
with a closely related issue, the enforceability of oral agreements modifying 
written standard-form contracts that by their terms prohibit oral modifica-
tion.109 Here the courts have held that while detrimental reliance or partial 
performance may make enforceable an oral promise modifying obligations 
in a standard-form contract that precludes such modification unless in writ-
ing, such reliance or performance must be “unequivocally referable” to the 
oral modifying promise and must not be “compatible” with the original 
agreement.110 
                                                                                                                      
 107. Calling the situation on this particular issue a “split” may be going too far, as even the 
strongest judicial statement in favor of holding that a merger clause bars evidence of fraud, UAW-
GM Human Res. Ctr. v. KSL Recreation Corp., 579 N.W.2d 411 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998), has already 
been subject to the limiting interpretation that it is inapplicable to frauds that allegedly nullify assent 
to an entire contract, as opposed to assent to a particular term. See Star Ins. Co. v. United Commer-
cial Ins. Agency, 392 F. Supp. 2d 927, 928-29 (E.D. Mich. 2005).  
 108. Compare Van Der Stok v. Van Voorhees, 866 A.2d 972, 975–76 (N.H. 2005), and Snyder 
v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1084–85 (Wyo. 1999), with Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 
N.E.2d 597, 599 (N.Y. 1959). 
 109. It is tautologically true that oral promises modifying a standard-form contract are made 
after oral promises or representations that are made before the individual has actually entered into 
the contract. It is true that the evidence I discuss above pertains almost entirely to post-contractual 
renegotiation by such agents. However, on my analysis, what is crucial is that firms screen custom-
ers by giving their agents the discretion to be more generous than the standard-form and that there is 
indeed evidence that this discretion is exercised. To the extent that the cases on, in particular, oral 
express warranties expanding upon the limiting language of a standard-form show that agents are 
making promises before the contract is even entered into, the cases themselves provide even more 
evidence of the kind of bargaining I discuss, including evidence suggesting that the bargaining to 
vary the terms of the standard-form may often occur much earlier, at the contract formation stage.  
 110. See Towers Charter & Marine Corp. v. Cadillac Ins. Co., 894 F.2d 516, 522 (2d Cir. 
1990) (citing Rose v. Spa Realty Assocs., 366 N.E.2d 1279, 1283 (N.Y. 1977)); see also Wis. Knife 
Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986) (interpreting oral promises modifying 
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Courts have dealt with consumer-sales contracts falling under the Uni-
form Commercial Code in a somewhat more liberal way. On the one hand, 
under section 2–316(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code,111 standard-form 
terms attempting the “negation or limitation” of express oral warranties are 
“inoperative” to the extent that they conflict with the express warranty.112 
While this might seem to make it too easy for a consumer buyer to falsely 
claim that a firm’s agent made an express warranty expanding on standard-
form promises, comment 2 to this same section, dismisses this worry with 
the explanation that “[t]he seller is protected under this Article against false 
allegations of oral warranties by its provisions on parol and extrinsic evi-
dence and against unauthorized representations by the customary ‘lack of 
authority’ clauses.”113 Neither of these points is convincing. A standard-form 
clause stating that an agent lacks actual authority can and sometimes should 
be overcome by showing a pattern or practice of agent representations and 
promises that establishes apparent agent authority. The Code’s parol evi-
dence rule is, moreover, very liberal in allowing for the admission of 
evidence of “course of dealing or usage of trade” to “explain” or “supple-
ment” standard-form terms.114 Especially given the language of section 2–
313 that a buyer need not show any “particular reliance” for oral express 
affirmations of fact “made by the seller about the goods during a bargain” to 
become part of the parties’ contract,115 the courts have generally admitted 
parol evidence of such affirmations and have ruled that they override the 
warranty exclusion clause of a standard form.116  
Turning to consumer-credit transactions, the Uniform Commercial 
Code’s liberal attitude toward course of performance evidence has led some 
courts to be too ready to find that a pattern of forgiving conduct has overrid-
den standard-form terms. This is dramatically illustrated by the split of 
authority on the issue of whether a consumer creditor who has accepted late 
payments as a matter of course may still insist upon the validity of a stan-
                                                                                                                      
written contracts which by their terms prohibit oral modifications as enforceable under U.C.C. § 2-
209 as waivers when there is proof of reliance). It is perhaps worth noting that standard economic 
theory of contract renegotiation cannot explain why courts would ever enforce a modification when 
the contract itself prohibited modifications. However, just as I have constructed an adverse selection 
– based explanation for enforcing such modifications, so too has Patrick W. Schmitz, Should Con-
tractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?, 21 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 315 
(2005) shown that certain kinds of contractual moral hazards can also justify enforcing such modifi-
cations.  
 111. U.C.C. § 2-316(a) (1998). 
 112. As comment 1 to U.C.C. § 2–316 explains, “[t]his section is designed principally to deal 
with those frequent clauses in sales contracts which seek to exclude ‘all warranties, express or im-
plied.’ It seeks to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by 
denying effect to such language when inconsistent with language of express warranty . . . .” U.C.C. 
§ 2–316 cmt. 1 (1998).  
 113. U.C.C. § 2–316 cmt. 2 (1998). 
 114. U.C.C. § 2–202(a) (1998). 
 115. U.C.C. § 2–313 cmt. 5 (1998). 
 116. See Richard F. Broude, The Consumer and the Parol Evidence Rule: Section 2–202 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 1970 Duke L.J. 881, 917; see also James J. White & Robert S. 
Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 12–4 (4th ed. 1995). 
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dard-form clause stating that such a pattern of behavior does not waive its 
rights to insist upon timely payment (an antiwaiver clause).117 One general 
approach holds that if the creditor has in fact induced the consumer bor-
rower to rely upon the ability to make late payments, then the creditor is 
estopped from reasserting its standard-form rights unless it first notifies the 
borrower. An alternative view holds that on basic Code principles of assent, 
a secured creditor’s course of conduct may effectively change the meaning 
of the contract so that regardless of reliance, by accepting late payment, a 
creditor has waived its own standard-form antiwaiver provision. In such 
case, the creditor can reinstate its right to insist upon timely payment only if 
it gives the borrower reasonable notice that it is reverting back to the origi-
nal, standard-form policy (and then only if the borrower has not materially 
changed its position in reliance on the waiver). 
On my theory, both of these approaches to creditor waiver of a standard-
form no-waiver clause fail to recognize the informational, screening func-
tion of creditor forgiveness. Creditors allow late payments as a kind of 
experiment even though they are not obligated to do so by their standard-
form agreement. What creditors are trying to discover is borrower type: is 
this a “good” borrower, one with a temporary problem only and whose busi-
ness we want to keep as a customer, or is this a “bad” borrower, one who 
really cannot make the agreed-upon payments and who is not worth keeping 
as a customer. When the creditor discovers a bad type, it will revert to the 
standard-form right to timely payment, which when not forthcoming will 
then allow it to declare the borrower in default and exercise its various stan-
dard-form default rights. On the margin, the risk that courts will find that 
tolerating late payments has entailed a loss of standard-form contractual 
rights makes forgiveness a riskier strategy for creditors. If the risk is signifi-
cant enough so that creditors find forgiveness too costly, then they will 
respond by making the basic credit terms—interest rate, repayment period, 
and the like—tougher, thereby excluding from the market precisely those 
good faith, but ex-ante risky consumer borrowers that the courts are un-
doubtedly anxious to help, not hurt. 
VI. Standard-Form Contracts Opting Out of Civil  
Liability as Determinants of the Viability of  
the Discretionary Benefits Equilibrium 
As I mentioned at the outset of the previous section, the kind of stan-
dard-form terms that I analyzed in that section, mainly governing the firm 
and customer’s respective performance obligations, are not those that have 
been the center of contemporary litigation and controversy. The most con-
troversial standard-form terms are those that govern the resolution of 
breakdowns in the parties’ relationship, breakdowns that reflect a failure  
of private cooperative resolution. Examples include clauses selecting the 
                                                                                                                      
 117. The discussion here is drawn from the opinion in Tillquist v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 714 
F. Supp. 607, 611-12 (D. Conn. 1989). 
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forum, or law, in which litigation will take place,118 and, even more contro-
versially, contract clauses mandating the arbitration of disputes.119 Such 
clauses are increasingly common not only in consumer contracts, but also in 
individual employment contracts. The Supreme Court has endorsed the use 
of such clauses in both contexts, even where the underlying consumer or 
employee complaint invokes a right created by federal statute. At the same 
time, the Court has made clear that the ultimate enforceability of such 
clauses remains a matter of state law, so that state judges are free to strike 
them down as substantively or procedurally unconscionable. 
Applying the classical exploitation theory of standard-form contracts to 
the new wave of employment-dispute arbitration contracts, academic com-
mentators have for the most part urged such judicial invalidation of 
mandatory arbitration clauses in employment and consumer contracts. In 
critiquing the Court’s decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,120 
my colleague Clyde Summers has recently provided an eloquent and suc-
cinct statement of this position: 
 The Gilmer arbitration clause had three basic characteristics that are 
common to all employment contracts which seek to substitute private arbi-
tration processes for public judicial processes. First, the arbitration 
provisions were not negotiated by the parties; they were constructed by the 
employer, or its lawyers, with an eye toward protecting and furthering the 
interests of the employer and were presented in a standard-form contract 
which the employee had to accept without change if he wanted to work. 
Second, the employee is frequently not made aware of an arbitration provi-
sion buried in the fine print or in an employee handbook. In Gilmer, the 
provision was not even in the employment contract, but in the exchange’s 
registration application that the employee was required to sign before be-
ing hired. Even when the provision is visible, the employee may not 
understand its impact or the rights that he is waiving. Third, the employee 
has no practical choice but to agree to the employer’s prescribed terms if 
he wants to obtain or retain the job. The choice is between agreeing and 
being unemployed, for other potential employers may have equivalent con-
tract clauses. In Gilmer, refusal to sign would have effectively barred Mr. 
Gilmer from working in the securities industry. The increasing common-
ness of these provisions in other industries significantly affects job 
opportunities. These employer-designed arbitration structures are properly 
described by the Court as “mandatory arbitration.” They are more descrip-
tively characterized as “take-it-or-leave-it” contracts.121 
On my theory of standard-form contracting, such general hostility to-
ward mandatory arbitration clauses is ill-founded and inimical to the kinds 
                                                                                                                      
 118. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991). 
 119. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 448 (2003); Green Tree Fin. 
Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 82-83 (2000); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 
U.S. 20, 23 (1991).  
 120. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 121. Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the 
Unwilling To Arbitrate, 6 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 685, 686-88 (2004) (footnotes omitted). 
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of cooperative consumer-firm and employee-employer relationships that are 
presumably everyone’s desired objective. The case for judicial enforcement 
of standard-form arbitration clauses does not deny that there are opportunis-
tic employers and consumer-goods manufacturers who will attempt to write 
complicated and technical arbitration clauses that effectively take away the 
employee or consumer’s right to press her dispute. But when courts have 
seen such clauses—that either foist all the costs of arbitration on the em-
ployee or consumer, or give the employer or firm discretion to choose 
arbitrators who are biased in its favor—they have almost uniformly struck 
down the clauses as substantively unconscionable.122 
Such a judicial approach is perfectly consistent with my earlier analysis 
of the proper judicial attitude toward the enforcement of firm promises to 
add to standard-form promises.  
The problem with the exploitation theory of mandatory arbitration 
clauses is that it focuses on these egregious, worst-case clauses—which 
courts will not enforce and which are surely a short-lived opportunistic ex-
ception—without advancing any explanation as to the general economic 
function served by reasonable mandatory arbitration clauses. Here, I de-
velop such a theory, one that shows why legal enforcement of arbitration of 
disputes that arise at the end of a consumer-firm or employee-employer rela-
tionship is crucial to the ability of firms and consumers and employers and 
employees to pursue the kind of tailored forgiveness and complaint-based 
benefits strategies that govern the performance of their ongoing and continu-
ing relationships. On my analysis, the question is what sort of dispute-
resolution regime best encourages cooperative resolution of performance 
problems in ongoing relationships, resolution that occurs in the shadow of 
the firm’s standard-form contract. The answer begins with a stylized de-
scription of what it is that mandatory arbitration clauses get the parties out 
of, the present day civil liability system. 
A. The Pathologies of Contemporary American Civil Liability 
The first problem with civil liability from the point of view of encourag-
ing firms to cooperatively resolve problems with customers and employees 
is not really a problem with the contemporary American civil liability sys-
tem, but one that is inherent in any formal public legal system: its 
publicness. A public record of legal proceedings and a tradition of written, 
publicly available judicial opinions designed to create precedent for the fu-
ture differs dramatically from private arbitration, where the default is that 
                                                                                                                      
 122.  See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 614 (D.S.C. 1998) (hold-
ing arbitration clause unconscionable where employer had total control over arbitrators); Knepp v. 
Credit Acceptance Corp., 229 B.R. 821, 837-38 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999) (finding unconscionable an 
arbitration clause in which debtor would be required to pay the costs of arbitration); Graham v. 
Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981) (holding arbitration clause substantively unconscionable 
where nonunion members forced to arbitrate before union arbitration panel); Abramson v. Juniper 
Networks, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422, 658-60 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that an express provision requiring 
an employee to pay half the costs of arbitration was unconscionable). 
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decisions do not generate publicly available written opinions and there is no 
publicly available record of the proceedings.  
The next thing to recognize about the American civil liability system is 
peculiar to the contemporary American system. This is that for product 
manufacturers and employers, that system is increasingly one that imposes 
precisely the kind of broad mandatory standard-form terms that I earlier 
concluded were unlikely to be in the interest of consumers and firms.123 
While some of these terms impose substantive limitations—product manu-
facturers cannot, for example, contractually exclude liability for personal 
injury caused by defective products124—the most important standard-form 
terms imposed by civil liability systems are those governing, or, more accu-
rately, not governing, the determination of damages. Under both state 
common law and federal statutes that protect consumers and employees, 
firms are liable not only for compensatory but also punitive damages for 
violations of a wide variety of mandatory standard-form terms (such as strict 
products liability and workplace discrimination). Somewhat tautologically, 
because firms cannot contract out of various mandatory substantive obliga-
tions imposed by state and federal consumer- and employee-protection 
legislation, when they contract for arbitration rather than civil liability as a 
means of resolving endgame disputes, it is the civil liability system of 
awarding damages that they are contracting out of. 
What is the civil liability damage system? It is one that not randomly but 
systematically tends toward both undercompensation and overcompensa-
tion. It overcompensates in cases where there is a relatively large loss and 
undercompensates plaintiffs who have suffered relatively small losses. Cases 
involving very large losses are straightforward to understand. Although they 
may occur with low probability, when they do occur, the injured consumer 
or employee has an individually viable lawsuit that carries with it a highly 
uncertain probability of a mega-damage award in the hundreds of millions 
or billions of dollars that substantially overcompensates the plaintiff. As I 
shall explain momentarily, while rare, such cases have a disproportionate 
influence on firm/employer behavior. The more common products or em-
ployment case involves not catastrophic loss but a loss that is so small to 
each consumer or employee that no individual would find it rational to bring 
a lawsuit for damages. Modern civil procedure has solved that problem with 
class-action litigation, a device which permits the aggregation of lots of little 
claims into a large claim. Such aggregation, however, does nothing to 
change the incentives of an individual to bring a lawsuit. Such an individual 
still has little at stake and no reason to sue. Class actions work not by chang-
                                                                                                                      
 123. For this important point, I am indebted to Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as 
Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 McGeorge 
L. Rev. 195 (1998). 
 124. See U.C.C. § 2–719(3) (1998) (“Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the 
person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable”). The only way to avoid such 
liability contractually is to warn the consumer against product risks, but such warnings do not apply 
to the risks caused by defective products, and the warnings themselves may be found inadequate, 
which makes even a non-defective product defective (for failure to include an adequate warning). 
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ing the incentives of individual consumers, but by allowing plaintiff’s attor-
neys to recover substantial compensation for pursuing the claims of a class 
of such harmed individuals. Because no individual consumer or employee 
has much at stake in such litigation, no individual has an incentive to ac-
tively monitor the attorneys who are ostensibly representing her interests. 
Without any real client to limit her discretion, the plaintiff’s class-action 
attorney is subject only to the highly variable but generally exceedingly def-
erential oversight of the trial judge. Under this system, class-action attorneys 
are free to strike mutually beneficial settlement deals with the product 
manufacturer defendants. Under a typical deal of this sort, a product manu-
facturer whose product has actually caused, say, $100 million in harm to 
consumers will agree to settle for far less, say $50 million, a substantial 
fraction of which, such as $10 million, goes to the plaintiffs’ attorneys. Con-
sumers as a group end up with $40 million, far less than the $100 million 
that they would be entitled to in an ideal system.  
A class-action system that generates such outcomes is subject to the ob-
vious criticism that by grossly undercompensating individual class 
members, it has also grossly underdeterred product manufacturers or em-
ployers. Such criticism commits the mistake of comparing the real with the 
ideal. Relative to a world without the class-action device, the existing sys-
tem at least generates some compensation and some deterrence. More 
importantly for present purposes, however, is to understand how there is a 
realistic alternative—private arbitration—and one that creates better incen-
tives for firms to bargain to establish and maintain lasting, cooperative 
relationships with consumers and employees. 
B. Cooperative Relationships Are More Likely in the Shadow 
of Arbitration than under the Risk of Civil Liability 
Recall from my earlier analysis that it is the business value of the rela-
tionship—the value of an individual as a repeat buyer or as a trusted 
employee—that the strategy of tough standard-form terms coupled with tai-
lored forgiveness and complaint-based benefits is designed to further. Such a 
strategy can breakdown entirely when the firm faces a risk of being sued in 
the civil liability system if the consumer or employee does not get all that 
she demands by way of forgiveness or additional benefits. There are several 
reasons for the breakdown. The first has to do with the inherent quality of 
publicly funded dispute resolution. If the firm’s practice of sometimes pay-
ing benefits and sometimes not is litigated in court, the firm may be found to 
have established a new, standard practice of paying such benefits. It may 
also be taken to have admitted liability—benefits are paid, after all, when 
the firm admits that the customer or employee has a valid complaint. What 
was meant to have been discretionary will become a mandatory, liability 
triggering duty. Similarly, if the firm sometimes forgives employee malfea-
sance or consumer delays in payment, then not only does it encourage 
opportunistic behavior by employees and customers, but it may be held to 
have established a new standard-form promise to do so in all cases.  
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The other and in some ways even more problematic aspect of civil liabil-
ity is the way that expectations about the magnitude of civil liability, rather 
than customer or employee value, can come to dominate and overwhelm the 
firm’s thinking about customer and employee relationships. The large varia-
tion in civil-damage awards makes expected ex-post liability outcomes, 
rather than the perceived business value of cooperative resolution, a key de-
terminant of what firms are willing to do. Firms have too great an incentive 
to resolve “cooperatively” complaints of questionable validity involving 
large customer or employee loss, and too weak an incentive to resolve much 
more clearly valid, but small customer and employee claims.125  
Now consider the management of employee and customer relationships 
under arbitration. The first difference, and a profound one, is that because 
arbitration proceedings are not public, the firm does not have to worry that 
cooperative resolution of employee and customer complaints, or forgiveness 
of customer or employee contractual shortfalls, will establish a binding 
precedent that converts these discretionary acts into mandatory obligations 
applying to all employees and customers with legally similar situations.126 
Thus, under arbitration, the extension of benefits or forgiveness to deserving 
employees and customers does not mean that the firm has opened the door 
to opportunistic claiming.  
The second profound difference between civil liability and arbitration 
goes to the pattern of outcomes and damage awards. In terms of outcomes, 
the three sharpest differences between arbitration and civil litigation are: 1) 
that plaintiffs succeed at a much higher rate in arbitration than they do in 
civil cases that go to trial; 2) that while plaintiffs get about the same median 
award in both civil trial and arbitration, they get a higher mean award and 
much larger damages in big, catastrophic cases in civil trial than arbitration; 
and, 3) because of the overall cost savings, plaintiffs are able to find attor-
neys to represent them and hence pursue some smaller cases that they would 
not pursue in the civil liability system.127 
The significance of these differences is that under arbitration, the loss 
suffered by a particular employee or customer will not be nearly as big a 
determinant of the firm’s breakdown payment to the employee or customer 
as it would be under civil liability. The firm’s incentive to accommodate and 
maintain an employee or customer relationship merely to stave off costly 
civil liability does not exist under arbitration. Because the required payment 
that the firm must make to an employee or customer when the relationship 
                                                                                                                      
 125. This is true notwithstanding the availability of the class action, since for small and me-
dium sized claims, class actions will not be economically attractive to plaintiffs’ attorneys unless 
there are a very large number of such claims that may be aggregated. It is true that in cases where 
the individual claim is small but there are a large number of claimants, the class action may be eco-
nomically viable when individual arbitration is not.  
 126. A similar point, but in a rather different context, is made by Bernstein, supra note 1, at 
1743, 1776. 
 127. Conclusions reached in a survey of empirical findings of arbitration versus civil litigation 
are presented in Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38 U.S.F. L. Rev. 
105, 108–17 (2003). 
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ends tends to be relatively uniform under arbitration, that payment will have 
less influence on whether the firm acts to prevent the relationship from end-
ing than it would under civil liability. When the value of the continuing 
relationship to the firm and employee/customer has little to do with the em-
ployee or customer’s loss in a particular instance, both the firm and the 
employee/customer are better off when it is the potential future value of the 
relationship, rather than the damages in a particular case, that determines 
their joint behavior in promoting its continuation. 
Appendix 
Ex-post versus Ex-ante Screening of Opportunistic Borrowers 
The claim in the main text was that if firms are not allowed to exercise 
their discretion to identify consumer borrowers ex post, renegotiating only 
with those that they find to have a legitimate reason for failing to pay on 
time and effectively screening out opportunistic borrowers, then firms will 
not be able to replicate such screening with different standard-form terms, 
such as the interest rate. This appendix demonstrates this assertion for a 
simple but fairly general model. 
Assume that a one-period loan is made in the amount L at interest rate r, 
and that there are two types of consumer, a good type who will repay the 
full amount L unless she suffers misfortune, in which case she can repay 
nothing. The probability of misfortune is given by q. There is also a bad 
type of consumer who will always claim to have suffered benefit B from 
using the borrowed money. Assume that at repayment time, the firm’s man-
ager will have learned enough to perfectly distinguish a good from bad type 
of borrower, so that under a policy of discretionary forgiveness, the loan will 
be forgiven if and only if the manager determines that the borrower is a 
good type who has really suffered misfortune. Ex ante, when the loan is 
made, the firm only knows the probability p of a good type (and so also the 
probability (1 – p) of a bad type) of borrower. I begin with the simplest case, 
in which the borrower is able to keep its entire benefit B when it fails to re-
pay the loan (the loan was entirely used up in consumption). 
The first proposition is that for any given interest rate r, the firm is better 
off when it pursues discretionary forgiveness than when it does not. This 
follows immediately from comparing the firm’s expected payoff when it 
pursues discretionary forgiveness, which is given by:  
(1 – q)rL – qL = L(r – q(1 + r))   (1) 
while its expected payoff when it does not pursue discretionary forgiveness 
is given by: 
p[(1 – q) rL - qL] - (1 – p)L    (2) 
Comparing (1) and (2), we see that the firm will always be better off 
when it investigates the truth of the borrower’s ex-post claim because oth-
erwise it will never be repaid by the bad-faith borrower. 
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By the same type of argument, the bad-faith borrower will always have a 
higher expected payoff, of simply B, when it is not investigated ex post, than 
when it is, in which case the bad borrower’s expected payoff will be  
(1 – q)(B – (1 + r)L) + qB = B – (1 – q)(1 + r)L (3), 
which is equal to the expected payoff that the good borrower gets regardless 
of whether or not the firm pursues a policy of discretionary forgiveness.  
To prove the claim in the text, observe first that under the discretionary 
forgiveness policy a mutually beneficial interest rate exists only if there ex-
ists an r such that both (1) and (3) are bigger than zero. For both (1) and (3) 








       (5) 
These conditions just say that the higher the probability of nonpayment, 
the higher the interest rate must be for the loan to be profitable for the 
lender, while the borrower can pay a higher interest rate and still take the 
loan, the higher the ratio of its benefit to the loan amount and the higher its 
probability of not having to pay the loan back is. A necessary and sufficient 
condition of an r satisfying both (4) and (5) is that qL < B, the borrower’s 
benefit must exceed the lender’s expected loss due to nonpayment. 
Were the firm to eschew the discretionary forgiveness policy, the interest 
rate that it would need to charge in order for the loan to be profitable would 







      (6) 
The right hand side in (4) is unambiguously less than the right hand side 
in (6). When the lender eschews the discretionary policy, it must toughen the 
standard-form term, the interest rate. Indeed, from (6) we can see that for a 
sufficiently low p, the probability of a good borrower type, there will not 
exist an interest rate such that the lender expects a positive payout. If the 
lender is not allowed to exercise discretionary forgiveness, but borrower 
opportunism is sufficiently likely, then it will not make the loan at all.  
